

NOTES ON WINE DISTRIBUTION

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What This Is (and Isn't):

These notes, now in their seventeenth year, are intended to serve discussion and development of wine distribution options in a changing legal environment, with emphasis on multi-state operations and alternatives to three-tier systems. They do not pretend to be a complete summary of the relevant law or a compliance handbook. For practical guidance, please see "Other Sources," on page 3 below.

The fine print: Nothing in this document constitutes legal advice or creates an attorney-client relationship. Regulators and government lawyers may disagree with observations in this document, as may courts resolving litigated issues. Neither completeness nor accuracy of the information in the notes is guaranteed. Laws may change without notice, and statements qualified as based on reports of others (*e.g.*, "reportedly") are generally unverified.

Terminology: The notes use "direct shipment" for winery sale and delivery directly to consumers and "direct distribution" for winery sale and delivery to retailers (also known as "winery self-distribution"), whether intrastate or interstate, and whether delivered by third party carrier or by the seller itself. "Retailer to Consumer" or "R2C" refers to shipment to a consumer by a seller holding a retailer license that authorizes sale to consumers of products of multiple third-party producers. Direct shipment and R2C may overlap somewhat, as direct shipment laws in some states appear to permit wineries to sell and ship wine produced by others. "Distribution" applies to all three, unless the context clearly limits it. Unless otherwise specified, notes apply to shipments by sellers, or seller-assisted shipment by a consumer customer who has purchased at the seller's premises, entirely within the U.S. An "on-site" sale is one in which the customer makes the purchase from the seller's existing inventory while physically present at the point of sale. References to "leveling up" and "leveling down" refer, respectively, to the state option to eliminate discrimination against interstate commerce by increasing shipment privileges of out-of-state sellers or by reducing privileges of in-state sellers. Unless the context requires otherwise, "wine" is under-21% table wine, but state laws vary on maximum alcohol percentage for sales under direct shipment laws and on whether addition of spirits puts the product in a category with different distribution requirements.

Revision:

I revise this document when material changes or additions accumulate significantly, but new releases may not reflect developments in all states since the preceding version. In particular, notes on litigation and pending legislation are usually limited to developments that have been reported in news media.

The **Release Number** appears in the file name of this document, shown in the lower right corner of each page. Please be sure you are reading the latest release (available at CorbinCounsel.com), and discard earlier releases. Headings of sections with substantial changes since the preceding release are **highlighted**.

Why It's Pertinent:

Wine distribution law is changing more rapidly and profoundly than at any time since Repeal. Published lists, carrier policies, and regulatory personnel (sometimes from the same agency) disagree on legality of various means of reaching customers, and regulators change their minds in response to numerous factors of varying transparency. Meanwhile, both the economic significance of alternative distribution methods and market access grow. In 2007 the Wine Institute estimated that wineries could lawfully ship directly to 80% of the adult U.S. population, but conceded that shippers still face “a labyrinth of state laws.” The size of the market has increased since then, but legal uniformity has not.

The May 2005 *Granholm* decision¹ of the U.S. Supreme Court casts doubt on the validity of many state laws, including the remaining handful of reciprocity statutes and laws disproportionately burdening interstate commerce relative to local commerce. The November 2005 and April 2006 district court *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen* rulings applied *Granholm* to interstate sales by wineries to retailers. Pending litigation addresses its potential application to sales by non-producing retailers.

Other aspects of the *Costco* case remain controversial. The April 2006 decision introduced a rigorous and in some respects novel application of federal antitrust law to state restraints on trade, including the frequently encountered requirement that chain stores exclude wine from their internal distribution systems. That judgment was mostly rejected by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its *Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maling* decision of January 29, 2008 (as amended April 1, 2008), which was not appealed.

Costco is significant for inducing the Washington state legislature to adopt a direct distribution option for out-of-state wineries and for confirming that federal antitrust law prevents the state from requiring suppliers to post their prices and hold them unchanged for a 30-day period, even if the system does not directly facilitate collusion. The plaintiff's decision not to appeal from the Ninth Circuit ruling leaves the difference in

¹ *Granholm v. Heald*, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), does not “open the states” to direct shipment, but (1) requires states to apply substantial location neutrality between in-state and out-of-state wineries when they regulate winery shipments to consumers and (2) significantly clarifies the nature and limits of states' rights under the 21st Amendment, with important implications beyond winery direct shipment. For an early analysis of its broader effects, see www.winebusiness.com/ReferenceLibrary/webarticle.cfm?dataId=38950. For recent commentary on application to retailer shipments, see <http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2007/10/05/wrong-but-not-surprising-a-loss-in-extending-granholm-to-shipments-by-retailers>.

approach to price posting schemes between *Costco* and a leading case from Fourth Circuit, *TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer*, for resolution in future litigation.

Federal district court decisions last year in Texas and Michigan extend *Granholm* to direct shipment by non-producing retailers, the opposite conclusion from a 2007 federal district court decision in New York. Potential conflict among the Fifth Circuit (including Texas), the Sixth Circuit (including Michigan), and the Second Circuit (including New York) on the meaning of *Granholm* increases the likelihood of another Supreme Court decision on the subject within a few years. However, it is unlikely that clarifying *Granholm* is a current priority for the Court; this year, it turned down an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of requiring in-person ordering for direct shipment, a restriction with obvious disadvantages for distant wineries relative to local producers.

In a time of uncertain rules, fiercely competing interests, and increasing reliance on vendors to perform legal compliance functions, the industry needs exchange of ideas and information. In these notes I try to look beyond the “go/no-go” lists, to stimulate awareness of what may be possible. That produces differences between the notes and other published counts. These notes identify only six states to which no shipment seems possible. A list circulated by general media in late 2007 counted 15 states prohibiting shipments from out-of-state sources, citing as examples Montana (where a convoluted law with criminal sanctions causes major carriers to forego the state), Utah (where direct shipment really is prohibited) and South Dakota (where a very limited amount purchased on site can be shipped home), without noting the differences.

Other Sources:

For practical compliance guidance, www.shipcompliant.com provides a free look at frequently updated instructions on shipping lawfully, with real-time automated transaction compliance available for a fee. Direct shipment information and commentary from various sources are at a related free public site, www.shipcompliantblog.com/blog, which offers a list server and RSS feeds for updates.

WineAmerica (formerly the American Vintners Association) provides members with a summary of direct shipment procedures with step-by-step instructions; the home site is www.wineamerica.org. Also handy are the publicly available compilations at www.wineinstitute.org/programs/shipwine, including a state law summary and a “Who Ships Where” table, <http://wineinstitute.shipcompliant.com/WhoShipsWhere.aspx>, listing states served by FedEx and UPS. The major carriers’ pairings of states of origin and states of destination are at www.dmz.fedex.com/cgi-bin/wineShipping.cgi and at the [UPS wine-shipping page](http://www.ups.com/wine), where one must click on “View Wine Contract Addendum A.” (Oddly, FedEx has not maintained a currently valid security certificate on its pairing page, which can set off alarm bells on some browsers.) General information on the FedEx wine program and links to wine-specific information are at www.fedex.com/us/wine; the analogous UPS site is ups.com/wine. Trade association members may be entitled to shipping discounts. Shipping policies can change without notice; one should check directly with carriers for recent developments.

Note that carrier-published lists may be authoritative as to policies of the carrier, but are not necessarily reliable as to current law. In the *Cherry Hill* opinion on shipments to Kentucky, the judge noted the discrepancy: “The defendants . . . assert that thirty-nine

states require in-person purchases, citing a chart from the UPS wine shipment program. From the court's review of this document, it appears that thirty-two states allow direct shipment with no such requirement."

As the direct sales segment matures, more resources appear. The trade magazine *Wines & Vines* has published on-line polls on winery experiences with alternative distribution, and articles on the topic appear in *Wine Business Monthly*. There is also a continuing stream of seminars devoted to direct shipment, with varying levels of sophistication.

Notes Applicable to Multiple States

Three-tier Distribution, Old & New:

Traditional distribution through wholesalers may be the only practical alternative for some markets and can be desirable on its own merits. However, imposition of a particular distribution structure by law is frequently inefficient and unfair.

Many states have enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract in supplier-wholesalers transactions, ranging from minor departures to imposition of detailed and onerous contractual obligations that can arise unintentionally from conduct that would ordinarily be regarded as preliminary to an agreement. The statutes are often called "franchise laws," but pseudo-franchise would be more descriptive, as they impose restrictions based on franchise laws upon business relationships that lack the defining features of true franchises.

Description of the counter-measures I recommend for selling to wholesalers in so-called franchise states is beyond the scope of these notes. Prudent wineries and importers do not send samples or sell wine to any wholesaler without a written agreement, which in about half the states must be designed specifically to avert, or at least minimize, adverse effects of special interest legislation. Further information is available on request by email to my address shown on the heading of these notes at page 1.

Constitutionality of mandated three-tier systems is a fertile area of litigation, even though the right of states to require all wine to go through three tiers without discrimination based on location is thus far unquestioned. Litigation has focused on discriminatory exemption of local sellers from forced use of a middle tier or from statutory prescription of contract terms. In Washington the state supreme court invalidated a mandatory middle tier law on the grounds it applied only to out-of-state wineries; the statute has been reenacted in nondiscriminatory form for beer only.

An important recent development is renewed interest in "drop shipment" of wine sold through three tiers —*i.e.*, sale by a winery to a wholesaler, from a wholesaler to a retailer, and a retailer to a consumer, but shipment directly from the winery to the ultimate purchaser (or to the retailer for local delivery to the consumer). Many states, often at the behest of wholesalers, have rules or policies prohibiting the practice, and federal authorities formerly questioned it; the usual reasons were the technical objection that license privileges are exercisable only at the named licensed premises and the practical consideration that physical presence of the goods at a wholesale warehouse facilitated excise tax auditing. As a sometimes-acceptable workaround, some regulators have tolerated "dock-bump" delivery, which involves a token trip to the wholesale warehouse,

eliminating the cost of unloading, placement in the warehouse, and reloading, but not the economic penalty of roundabout routing.

Lately, some regulators have reexamined drop shipment issues and concluded that sales documentation provides an adequate paper trail for tax audit purposes and that the need for license-premises connection is merely theoretical. In 2006 New York approved a drop shipment program to allow *retailers* to receive special items ordered on winery web sites (logistically, but not economically, equivalent to direct distribution), with automated generation of paperwork documenting a sale by the winery to an authorized wholesaler and by the wholesaler to the ordering retailer. Reportedly, negotiations for similar rulings have taken place nationally, with seven states nixing direct delivery to retailers and, thus far, ten following New York's lead (plus Washington, which alone expressly permits actual direct distribution by statute, a move made in response to the *Costco* litigation).

Age & Identity Verification:

Direct shippers cannot safely delegate compliance with minimum age requirements to carriers, even if the carrier collects an extra fee for verification. The Massachusetts Supreme Court decision affirming suspension of Wine.com's shipper license because of FedEx's delivery to a 19-year-old consignee underscores responsibility of the seller to verify age at the time of purchase.

Although the image of teenagers ordering table wine shipped direct for youthful drinking bouts may seem almost humorously unrealistic, there is nothing unreal about the publicity campaigns in favor of restricting direct shipment. A wholesaler-funded report released in August 2006 by Teenage Research Unlimited showed 2% of teens self-reporting purchase of an alcoholic beverage from some source over the Internet, with an additional 12% reporting they had heard of another teenager's having done so. Most headlines characterized the report as reassuring, but its sponsors have ballyhooed it as proof of an imminent flood of wine in underage hands.

Some direct shipment laws (at last count, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio, and Georgia) require use of approved verification systems, and verification is part of the voluntary "[Wine Industry Code for Direct Shipping](#)" proposed by Free the Grapes and endorsed by the major winery trade associations. It makes sense to use robust systems everywhere, because they tend to quell irrational fears and because the entire industry has an interest in averting even an aberrant sale or delivery to an underage recipient. For more information, see www.idology.com, www.choicepoint.com and www.veratad.com, all of which offer systems approved by one or more state agencies. Integrity Identity Verification Services, a well-known company in the on-site age verification business, has entered the field with its "Integrity:Direct" system and claims acceptance by unspecified alcoholic beverage control authorities, <http://integrity.aristotle.com/content/view/47/80/>.

On-site Sales under Federal Law:

The Transportation Security Administration carry-on ban of over-3-oz. containers of most liquids² accentuates the importance of the federal direct shipment statute³, enacted

² See <http://www.tsa.gov/311/index.shtm>. Slightly different rules apply to duty-free purchases, www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/duty_free.shtm.

as § 11022 of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 2002, to facilitate security by reducing the volume of airline passenger baggage. It creates a federal-state hybrid alternative to whatever method, if any, a state provides for “personal importation” (*i.e.*, bringing the wine with you into the state), by allowing the winery to ship wine purchased “while the purchaser was physically present at the winery” that would otherwise go as luggage. Most states have a personal importation exception to their prohibitions of unlicensed importation, usually for quantities that would fit in a glove box or handbag, but in some cases for enough to make shipment feasible. Volume limitations applicable to shipping on-site purchases appear in the state notes below, but in practice they raise issues of interpretation and enforcement, none of which has been definitively resolved. Prudence suggests a “no” answer to questions such as whether separately invoiced “importations” can be aggregated in one box and whether on-site purchase of futures or club subscription wines not yet released constitute an on-site sale, but without a judicial determination for each ambiguous phrase it is impossible to be sure.

Although the federal direct shipment statute is not interpreted in the same way by all state agencies, is ambiguous regarding whether it supplements formal methods of direct shipment, is in effect only so long as the FAA security restrictions on air travel remain in place, and imposes requirements on the selling winery regarding proof of age, *etc.*, in addition to those that may apply under state law or be implemented by carriers, it appears to open some markets for sales to winery visitors who want their in-person purchases shipped home and is so interpreted by the major delivery carriers. The notes below may omit reference to the federal direct shipment statute for a state if that option does not add substantially to direct shipment rights under other laws.

See below in this introduction for federal penalties on illegal interstate shipment and federal constitutional issues arising from the disproportionate burden on out-of-state wineries from uniform on-site-only shipment laws.

Tax and Liability Traps:

Unintended consequences may follow application for a license or permit to ship to consumers in another state. In addition to the administrative burdens of filing shipping reports and/or excise tax returns, direct shipment may subject a winery to jurisdiction of the recipient state on the same basis as businesses located there, including imposition of business taxes on gross receipts and susceptibility to tax liens and service of process. States with income taxes may require returns for revenues derived from sales by out-of-state wineries that have sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites or have consented to jurisdiction as part of a shipping permit process. Wineries should consult counsel about secondary effects before signing license applications.

Some state statutes can be read to impose liability on a winery for shipping wine to a consumer that causes the customer to go over an aggregate annual limit set for purchases from all direct shippers. Winery ordering procedures should require all purchasers to represent and warrant that filling the order will not violate state law, with special attention to aggregate limit states, but the effect of relying on consumer representations is

³ 27 U.S.C. § 124.

uncertain. Indiana has clarified its position on enforcement in a manner that makes consumer representations effective so long as the winery's own shipments for the year are not over the limit. Questions may exist in other aggregate limit states, which at last count included Ohio, Nevada, North Dakota, and Wisconsin.

Most direct shipment sales are now subject to state and local sales and use taxes, which may vary by county or other political subdivision. Formerly, the most prudent practical way to deal with it was to pay the highest rate in the state for all destinations, as the difference is tiny compared to the annoyance of calculating tax by address within a state. Paying an average or median rate does not constitute compliance, because tax authorities do not credit taxpayers with overpayments on other sales. However, modern compliance software, such as the web-based ShipCompliant program, can now deal with the plethora of tax rates to avert both underpayment and overpayment. Note also that state excise taxes often have a higher rate for "dessert" or "fortified" wine, a category that usually includes unfortified table wine containing more than 14.0% alcohol.

Rethinking Reciprocity:

Reciprocity has been turned on its head since *Granholm*. Under the pre-*Granholm* regime, laws allowing direct shipment among states that offered one another's wineries equivalent privileges were considered a pro-commerce development and the basis for a stable, if geographically limited, trade in wines outside the three-tier system. Although reciprocal shipment was not directly before the court in *Granholm*, the Supreme Court made it clear that trading areas within the United States, excluding sellers in states that do not join the trade group, are incompatible with the Commerce Clause. That message, however, has not fully worked its way through the organs of state government that regulate trade in wine.

New York, one of the two states before the Court in *Granholm*, found its discriminatory non-reciprocal law invalidated, but ironically adopted in its place a quasi-reciprocal law that might not pass constitutional muster. California sensibly repealed its reciprocity requirement for winery shipments, but retained it for the added category of non-producer retailers; however, in 2006 the state entered into a possibly temporary agreement with a retailer trade association that effectively extends the privilege to retailers in non-reciprocal states, at least while litigation is pending.

We can expect a substantial period of transition from reciprocity laws. Illinois switched to a permit system in June 2008, and Wisconsin adopted a license system that became effective in October 2008. At last count, no replacement had been enacted in Iowa (where permit legislation was recommended by regulatory agency, but not acted on by the legislature), New Mexico (where a permit bill died in the legislature) or New York (where a "substantially equivalent" requirement, which looks close enough to reciprocity for Commerce Clause purposes, is not enforced). It doesn't matter for Commerce Clause analysis whether a law is termed reciprocal or not; the aspect condemned in *Granholm* is treating sister states differently with respect to trade, depending on the conformity of their laws with one's own.

Predicting the behavior of administrative agencies and courts is made more difficult by ambiguities in wording. For example, Iowa's statute refers to states providing an "equal reciprocal privilege." Under ordinary rules of statutory construction, that means the

privilege must be both equal and reciprocal. Access involving a license fee or paperwork that differs from the recipient state may or may not be “equal.” Moreover, the Iowa text may or may not require that the other state apply *restrictive* reciprocity, *i.e.*, prohibit shipments from wineries in non-reciprocal states, rather than allow wineries in all states, including Iowa, to ship in.

Federal Regulation: The Tobacco, Tax & Trade Bureau (TTB), successor agency to ATF, has a web site, www.ttb.gov/publications/direct_shipping.shtml, with information on efforts to lend federal weight to state laws restricting wine distribution. It points out that the 1913 federal Webb-Kenyon Act is still on the books, forbidding shipment of alcoholic beverages “intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used in violation of any law” of the recipient state, and that winery basic permits are held under the condition that the permittee obey federal liquor laws, including Webb-Kenyon. Suppliers, the site concludes, “should remember that their Federal basic permits could be at risk if they fail to comply with State rules.” In a January 2007 interview, TTB administrator John Manfreda said no state had requested action by his agency, in part because wholesaler-sponsored federal legislation from 2000 (fatuously entitled the “21st Amendment Enforcement Act”) authorizes state attorneys general to seek federal court injunctions themselves against liquor sales that contravene state law.

Further Constitutional Questions:

Commercial Speech. Several states restrict advertising for sales by direct shipment. Restraints on truthful and non-misleading commercial speech are questionable under the First Amendment. Some liquor laws restricting speech have already been invalidated, and more challenges are likely. Meanwhile, methods of promoting sales by means other than traditional media are proliferating, generating varied responses from regulators. The application of constitutional commercial speech rights to novel practices, such as unlicensed consumer “parties” at which sales reps promote use of a conveniently located computer to order on line, is yet to be determined.

Volume Caps and On-site Requirements.

Under *Granholm*, the Commerce Clause requires states either to give local and out-of-state wineries access to consumers and retail accounts on economically equivalent terms or to deny it altogether. In response, some legislatures have attempted to accommodate wholesaler interests by allowing direct shipment or direct distribution only for wineries with annual production or capacity under a gallonage cap, typically set just above the output of the largest local winery and well below many producers in the major winegrowing states, and/or by imposing an “equal” requirement that consumer purchases be made in person at the winery, irrespective of location.

State laws that are not overtly (or, as lawyers call it, “facially”) discriminatory, can be invalid if the discriminatory *effect* is not justified by their furthering of legitimate state objectives. Challenge to production caps and on-site requirements for discrimination arising from disproportionate burden on interstate commerce is under way.

Cases against laws that are facially neutral impose a substantial evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs and, because they often need fact-based economic analysis, can be expensive to litigate. Plaintiffs expecting to shoot fish in the *Granholm* barrel will likely be

disappointed by the cost and complexities of litigation when the state has not enacted forthright protectionism.

There have been some recent successes, notwithstanding the issues of proof. In December 2006, the Kentucky *Cherry Hill* case (formerly known as *Huber Winery v. Hudgins*) held that impermissible discriminatory effects resulted from a facially nondiscriminatory on-site requirement, but not from a volume cap or small per-order limit. In November 2008, *Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins* in Massachusetts achieved a solid pro-commerce result, holding that a volume cap intentionally crafted so as not to exclude any local winery constituted discrimination both in purpose and effect, and that state could not apply it to exclude the larger (*i.e.*, exclusively out-of-state) wineries.

Nevertheless, failed challenges in a string of federal suits –*Black Star Farms LLC v. Oliver* in Arizona, *Baude v. Heath* in Indiana, *Cherry Hill Vineyard v. Baldacci* in Maine and *Jelovsek v. Bredesen* in Tennessee– provide a telling lesson in the difference between overt discrimination cases like *Granholm* and claims of disproportionate burdens. With statutes that are facially non-discriminatory and serve legitimate regulatory objectives, invalidity depends on showing the state system harms interstate commerce out of proportion to the purported local benefit. The burden of proving adverse effects rests on the winery and consumer plaintiffs, who are unlikely to prevail if they approach the litigation as though they had the benefit of the *Granholm* presumptions. A legislative history showing intent to assist local commerce by setting caps to allow all in-state wineries to sell direct, as in *Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins*, sustains assessing the caps under strict anti-discrimination principles, but such smoking gun quotations seldom turn up in legislative records.

Apart from constitutionality, questions may arise about the meaning of legislated caps. For example, the Arkansas direct distribution statute refers to sales as reported on the winery's TTB Report of Wine Premises Operations, which does not report sales. Thus, it is unclear whether the relevant number is tax-paid withdrawals during the year or consummated sales in the same period, possibly including transfers in bond that would not show as withdrawals and/or wine removed from bond in a previous year.

An interesting alternative to judicial challenge of volume caps is what might be called the “Jess Jackson workaround,” in which an enterprise linked by common equity ownership sells through two or more separately licensed entities. Sales into Kentucky by the under-cap Atalon and La Jota operations, both owned by Jackson Family Farms, LLC, have evoked howls of outrage from state wholesalers, who seem belatedly to understand that laws restricting rights based on size of operation need consolidation rules to be effective.

On-site restrictions have elicited different responses from different courts. The February 2008 decision by an Arizona federal district court in *Black Star Farms* upheld in-person purchase as a precondition to direct shipment. In-person purchase as a precondition to direct shipment solves a fundamental political problem for the middle tier. Although *Granholm* allows states to eliminate discrimination against interstate direct shipment by forbidding in-state shipment, pursuing that “level down” strategy requires extravagant expenditure of political capital, because it constitutes a death sentence for a significant portion of local wineries. Thus, wholesaler trade associations face reconciling survival of direct shipment for local wineries with the core objective of forcing the larger wineries

found in other states to go through three tiers, a conceptual problem after *Granholm*. (The legislative goal of maintaining a mandated middle distribution tier for products of large producers, *without* protectionist exemption of local wineries, is neither condemned nor definitively authorized by *Granholm*.)

Decisions like *Black Star Farms* have voiced the “accident of geography” theory, which contends that the impracticality of, *e.g.*, an Arizona consumer’s visiting a Yakima Valley winery to place an order for a wine advertised on the Internet, compared to the convenience of visiting an Arizona winery for the same purpose, does not discriminate against interstate commerce. The New York federal district court in *Arnold’s Wines v. Boyle* (appealed as *Buy Right, Inc. v. Boyle*), a Tennessee federal district court in *Jelovsek v. Bredesen*, and the otherwise pro-trade Texas federal district court in *Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Perry* appear also to have bought the theory; federal district courts in the Kentucky case, *Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins* (affirmed as *Cherry Hill Vineyards v. Lilly*), and (though later reversed) in the Indiana case, *Baude v. Heath*, rejected it. Appeals are reportedly under way in the second, fourth, and ninth federal circuits. The Seventh Circuit’s reversal of *Baude* is final, as the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their petition for Supreme Court review, but if other circuits reach conflicting conclusions, the issue is likely to reach the Court at some point.

The geographic accident argument does not seem logical. With respect to governmental restrictions, the Commerce Clause is supposed to provide equal access to markets for interstate commerce originating in any location. True, it does not require states to neutralize natural effects of geography, such as the greater cost of shipping from a distant point, but the trade restriction in question arises from the legislative pen, not from geography itself. For legislation, the Commerce Clause supports location parity by voiding state enactments with substantial discriminatory effects, including the effect of leveraging location advantages of local businesses against distant competitors. If one supposes as a thought experiment that a New York law involved in *Granholm*, which permitted local wineries to ship directly within the state if their wines were made from New York-grown grapes, authorized any winery to ship directly to New York consumers with the same grape source restriction, then supporters of the geographic accident theory would presumably argue that the *Granholm* court would have upheld the law, even if it practically excluded the California and Virginia winery plaintiffs.

Ironically, *Black Star Farms* cites a 1994 Supreme Court case, *C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown*, which invalidated a facially neutral city ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste received and processed in the town to be deposited at the defendant township’s transfer station. The fatal flaw of the *Clarkstown* ordinance was that in practice it favored local waste management business to the exclusion of all non-local competition, which sounds pretty similar to a three-tier requirement for out-of-state businesses, but the *Black Star Farms* court decided not to follow that precedent for reasons that are difficult to divine in its opinion.

There is, however, a basis for the anti-trade result in *Black Star Farms* and other recent cases other than the geographic accident defense to *Granholm*-based suits –the theory that for non-facial discrimination the plaintiff must prove, presumably with economic expert testimony based upon factual research, the existence of a market from which it

was excluded or to which its access was unduly burdened. The *Black Star Farms* judge articulates the point in refusing to reach the same result as *Hudgins* and *Baude*: “However, Plaintiffs proffer no evidence to suggest that such a limited exception, applicable to both in-state and out-of-state wineries, erects a barrier to Arizona’s wine market that in effect creates a burden that alters the proportional share of the wine market in favor of in-state wineries, such that out-of-state wineries are unable to effectively compete in the Arizona market.”

Other Local Favoritism. Legal scrutiny is less developed for restrictions other than volume caps and on-site limitations. The Louisiana “Wine Producers Act,” in partial compensation for taking direct distribution away from in-state wineries to forestall a *Costco* challenge by out-of-state suppliers, expands the rights of wineries to market their products through local fairs, festivals and non-profit special events, a feature that raises its own *Granholm* issues because of disproportionate availability to local producers. Similar issues arise under the proposed Texas festival license (SB 711, at last report before the governor for signature), which would be available to holders of winery permits, not expressly limited to in-state applicants, but which require wineries in counties that have not had local election approval of retail sales to use Texas raw materials, and under existing local grape content requirements for certain winery license privileges (as distinct from appellation requirements), such as are found in Iowa and to some extent in Pennsylvania. Raw materials restrictions may have a direct adverse effect on interstate trade in bulk wine, juice or grapes, as well as practically favoring local producers with respect to finished goods, and therefore raise substantial *Granholm* issues.

Application of Federal Antitrust Law under the Supremacy Clause.

Some nondiscriminatory state restraints on streamlined distribution raise issues under the Sherman Act and possibly under other federal trade regulation laws. Because federal statutes preempt inconsistent state laws under the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution, the Supreme Court has invalidated conflicting state liquor laws such as those requiring unsupervised price-fixing by wholesalers. Although the Commerce Clause is, in a sense, the foundation of antitrust challenges because it grants Congress the power to maintain the competitiveness of interstate trade, antitrust cases do not enjoy the strong presumption of illegality that applies to state laws directly discriminating against interstate commerce, as in *Granholm*.

The trial court decision in *Costco* was the vanguard for applying federal antitrust law to state liquor regulation, recognizing a right of suppliers to ship to retailers’ central warehouses, omit price posting, offer quantity discounts, *etc.* If it had been sustained in its entirety on appeal, numerous laws that protect middle-tier turnstiles at the expense of producer and consumer interests would have been subject to challenge, but only the invalidation of “post and hold” pricing was affirmed. Substantial questions remain as to how the regulatory agency can enforce the now-validated rules requiring uniform delivered pricing and forbidding quantity discounts, without the discarded posting system. The Ninth Circuit opinion is unclear on whether posting without the “hold” requirement would be permissible, but administering an instantly changeable posting system would be challenging and of dubious benefit to anyone. Costco raised the

irrationality of teasing the system apart in its petition for rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit did not alter or clarify its opinion when it denied the petition on April 1, 2008.

Administrative Burdens. Indirect forms of discrimination against interstate commerce, such as onerous fees and reporting requirements not required of local wineries, persist. *Granholm*'s economic equivalence standard logically should take into account all substantial costs, but the Supreme Court opinion does not provide exact guidelines for gauging whether particular differences are permissible.

Direct Shipment by Retailers

Retailers as a category now embrace some brand owners who wish to appear in the market as "virtual wineries" (although other licensure strategies may be preferable for that business objective), as well as the well-known Internet bottle shops. The latter group and their trade association, Specialty Wine Retailers, www.specialtywineretailers.org/, have been highly active in the important area of applying *Granholm* to interstate sales by sellers not licensed as wineries.

Two cases brought by the same interstate retailer have resulted in different rulings. In September 2008, a Michigan federal district court in *Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholm* simply extended the *Granholm v. Heald* holding to the bottom tier, requiring the same direct shipment privileges for out-of-state retailers as the state had granted its own retail licensees. (For later history of the case, see "Litigation" under the Michigan state entry, below.)

In January 2008, a district court in Texas had rendered a conceptually pro-trade decision in *Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Perry* (with which *Wine Country Gift Baskets.Com v. Steen* is consolidated), with a qualification that produced a quite different result. The case upholds the basic Specialty Wine Retailers contention that a state allowing its retailers to deliver to consumers must permit direct shipment by out-of-state retailers. It also has some important things to say about the meaning of *Granholm*'s less pellucid passages. In particular, it attempts to deal with the most significant internal tension of the *Granholm* majority opinion, *viz.*, the difficulty of squaring the holding of the opinion, that states cannot require out-of-state wineries to become residents as a condition to reaching local markets, with a dictum-within-a-dictum quoted from a 1990 Supreme Court case, *North Dakota v. United States*, to the effect that the 21st Amendment empowers states "to require that all liquor sold for use in the State be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler." (For an explanation of the difference between holdings and dicta, see www.shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2007/09/18/discrimination-against-out-of-state-retailers-after-granholm/.)

The Texas *Siesta Village* decision and its implications merit attention, in particular on the following points:

1. Texas had a "citizenship" requirement of at least a year's residence in the state for most licenses. It had already been declared unconstitutional when applied to newly arriving wholesalers with physical premises within the state. *Siesta Village* goes farther by analyzing the statute as a *location* requirement and holding it unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds, to the extent it prevented issuance of the requisite retailing licenses to out-of-state retailers. That suggests location

- neutrality can be squared with the 21st Amendment by preserving the state's power to license and requiring it to issue licenses to out-of-state applicants.
2. The *Siesta Village* judge takes *Granholm* as a location parity case, and his opinion is explicit that physical presence requirements “plainly discriminate against interstate commerce.” However, like every analyst of *Granholm*, he had to deal with a key question posed by the quotation from *North Dakota*, noted above: If a state has the right to require all wine to “be purchased from a licensed in-state wholesaler,” how does one give effect to the Commerce Clause policy against location discrimination? One way of resolving the issue is to require the state to accept methods of consummating the purchase requirement that do not substantially burden interstate commerce relative to local, such as running the sale through the local middle tier without requiring the wine to take an economically disadvantageous logistical path when sold by an out-of-state retailer. Another is to declare that the “in-state” part of the quotation is dicta and therefore not binding in applying the *Granholm* holding to a different chain of distribution where its effect on commerce is more problematic. That may be rather too bold a departure to expect in a district court opinion, but it would support the most straightforward solution to the three-tier problem – issue Texas licenses to wholesalers in other states. In the event, the judge simply let the contradiction lie, holding that the retailers have to comply with Texas laws requiring a state retail license and purchase from a Texas-licensed wholesaler, a deferral that has been described as a ticket to the next round of litigation. Meanwhile, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has informally commented that it is not their problem.
 3. Experts disagree on the extent to which *Granholm* was a “weak record case” that could have gone the other way had the states made a better showing of regulatory problems, for example in tax collection and averting deliveries to underage recipients. *Siesta Village* took the opposite view and granted summary judgment, which means the court decided Texas failed to show substantial likelihood that, if it were afforded a full hearing, it would present evidence on which a judgment in its favor could be based. To win in a direct discrimination case like *Granholm* or *Siesta Village*, a state would have to show there is no reasonable alternative to discrimination for achieving legitimate regulatory objectives. The *Siesta Village* court reads *Granholm* to say that the availability of licensing and modern communications makes such an argument inherently implausible, and comes close to saying a state can never prevail on the proposition that interstate delivery is more likely to cause underage drinking than intrastate delivery.
 4. Another point of controversy among lawyers is whether the Commerce Clause is indifferent to whether a court cures discrimination by leveling up or down. *Siesta Village* takes the side of those who argue that it makes no sense to level down in enforcing a constitutional provision intended to encourage interstate trade, at least in the absence of manifest legislative intent to terminate in-state privileges in case of invalidity of interstate prohibition. In constitutional law terms, the *Siesta Village* judge may have discovered a penumbra to the Commerce Clause, preventing courts from taking such simplistic approaches as counting the number

of lines of statutory text that would have to be rewritten and picking the smaller revision.

5. Although *Siesta Village* rejected the wholesalers' strange argument that the statutory discrimination arose not from Texas's intent, but from the happenstance of the plaintiffs' locations, the court indulged in dicta indicating states can adopt on-site-only laws, in which case the "accident of geography," and not state discrimination, would be responsible for excluding remote sellers. It appeared to accept the reasoning that because there is no "direct shipment market" in those states, the remote sellers are not excluded from anything by the prohibition. That argument appears flawed in construing the Commerce Clause, whose policy extends to disproportionate burden as well as to overt discrimination. If carrier delivery is the only way and out-of-state winery can compete in a market defined as direct wine sales to local customers, then the playing field is not leveled by placing the same ban on local wineries, who can reach the market without it.

The intervening wholesalers, the state and the plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where the case was consolidated with another Texas case, *Wine Country Gift Baskets.Com v. Steen*. The *Siesta Village* appeal was dismissed 15 May 2008 on motion of the plaintiff, but *Wine Country* is proceeding. The appellate court heard oral argument on 31 March 2009, and at last report both sides were engaging in follow-up supplemental citation of authorities. Although one cannot predict the decisional analysis the Fifth Circuit will adopt, the case may be headed toward dealing with a central question of *Granholm*, whether the 21st Amendment carves out a special place for three-tier distribution, permitting discrimination against interstate commerce that will not be tolerated for direct sales by producers.

Meanwhile, the more general *Wine Country* question, whether *Granholm*'s location neutrality principal extends to non-producing retailers at all, remains open, with different answers in different district courts. The parties in *Knightsbridge Wine Shoppe, LTD v. Jolly* had agreed to extend *Granholm* to non-producing retailers selling to California consumers through the end of 2008. A change of defendant directors did not change state policy, and on 5 January 2009 both sides agreed to dismiss the action in view of their previous stipulation that the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage had never enforced state licensing, importation, and retailer direct shipment reciprocity statutes against carriers or out-of-state retailers shipping wine to adult Californians for personal non-resale use, a point the state had advanced as rendering the suit premature. In a New York case, *Arnold's Wines, Inc. v. Boyle* (known on appeal as *Buy Rite, Inc. v. Boyle*), the New York federal district court dismissed a retailer suit without an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that the state had a 21st Amendment right to require all sales to go through an in-state wholesaler, a proposition suggested by the vexing Scalia dictum in the *Granholm* opinion.

The *Arnold's Wines* decision seems to miss *Granholm*'s point that a state may have the right to require all wine to go through three tiers, but does not have the right to apply its rule with location discrimination unless it provides evidence that its discrimination against interstate sellers is required by a legitimate state objective that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means. The *Siesta Village* judge in Texas expressly declined to follow *Arnold's Wines*, which he plausibly characterized as putting the 21st

Amendment above the Commerce Clause, precisely what *Granholm* forbids. The judge in the Michigan *Siesta Village* case was even clearer on R2C rights of out-of-state retailers, omitting any requirement that they purchase from Michigan wholesalers –in effect, a frontal challenge to a state’s right to maintain a three-tier system by means of location discrimination.

Interstate Wholesaling. Although it would not be surprising to see a wholesaler break ranks and invoke the *Granholm* principle to cross state lines, suits with that objective seem to have remained in the realm of rumor. The *Southern Wine* case in Texas found a one-year residence requirement for wholesalers unconstitutional, but did not reach the key point on location discrimination because the plaintiffs formed a Texas corporation and indicated their intent to operate facilities physically located in the state.

Federal Preemption of State Delivery Laws. Some observers have suggested that a federal suit invalidating Maine’s requirements for averting delivery of cigarettes to minors makes it impossible for states to enact statutes requiring carriers to verify age of wine recipients. I think the case does nothing of the kind, but the wholesalers have been presenting it to regulators as a serious problem. For differing viewpoints on the controversy, see <http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2008/02/25/another-rowe-to-hoe/>.

Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages other than Wine. A 2006 ruling in Ohio applied *Granholm* to keg beer sold by retailers, but the relevance of *Granholm* to beverage categories other than wine remains largely unexplored. Meanwhile, states can, of course, permit direct shipment for other beverages by statute, as has occurred for beer in some instances, and existing personal importation laws may allow on-site purchase and transportation of small quantities of beer or spirits.

Direct Distribution by Out-of-state Suppliers.

The federal district court in *Costco* found it relatively easy to rule in the plaintiff’s favor on the direct distribution issue, relative to some of the antitrust counts, and that part of the judgment was not affected by the adverse appellate ruling, because the legislature had already settled the leveling issue. Before *Costco*, Washington had granted direct distribution privileges only to its own wineries, a discrimination the judge found directly contrary to *Granholm*. Although the result was not immediately pro-commerce (judicially leveling down, with a stay to permit the legislature to rescue local wineries by leveling up), the case seems persuasive precedent against discriminatory direct distribution laws, which remain common among winery licensing statutes and administrative practices.

While there is little logical basis for distinguishing between producers and wholesalers who want to reach retailers in other states, it seems likely that post-*Granholm* law will preserve states’ rights to require “every drop” to go through a middle-tier business. In that case, a state legislature willing to kill off home state wineries that depend on direct distribution could allow only wholesalers to sell to retailers, but might be constitutionally prohibited from specifying where the wholesalers may be located. Oregon faced that issue with respect to wholesaling licenses in the *Morchella Wine Cellars* appeal, but the case appears to have been mooted by legislation that became effective at the beginning of 2008.

Direct Shipment by Overseas Sellers. An unanswered question is whether *Granholm* and GATT create rights in overseas wineries to distribute in the U.S. market on the same basis as domestic competitors. A 2006 state court suit in Illinois, *Raimondi v. Koppel*, raised the discrimination issue on behalf of an Italian winery, but the plaintiff's motivations were unclear, as the complaint relied only on state law and sought to level down –i.e., to prevent Illinois wineries from exercising statutory direct distribution privileges. Nothing has been reported about it since it was filed.

A Limitation of Litigation: Court decisions that invalidate state restrictions on wine distribution can be exhilarating, but for two reasons usually do not set things right overnight. First, federal district judges have the power to “stay” their own injunctions pending resolution of an appeal by the state (usually joined by the wholesaler trade association). A stay on appeal is an order postponing the effective date of the injunction until the appellate process has been completed, often around two years. Although trial judges have broad discretion regarding stays, widely accepted standards call for taking four factors into account: (1) whether the party applying for the stay has made a “strong showing” that it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) whether the party will be irreparably injured by denial of a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) the effect of granting or denying the stay on the public interest.

Stays denied by a district court can be granted by a judge of the appellate court. In either instance, a stay provides sufficient time for interests that support the challenged restriction to respond in the state legislature. If, for example, a district judge finds a statute unconstitutional under *Granholm*, but the ruling is stayed pending resolution of the appeal, a legislative fix by leveling down may end the matter; even a legislative attempt to achieve the same result with less overt discrimination against interstate commerce may moot the case on appeal and start the game over from the first with a new statute, in effect putting the finding of unconstitutionality aside forever.⁴

Nevertheless, it makes sense to litigate if the factual proof is there. A successful outcome will force opponents to seek new legislation to restore restriction, and it is always easier to stop a bill than to pass one. Thus, pro-commerce interests without the political muscle to modify state law in a frontal legislative attack may, after invalidating a restrictive statute in court, be able to stop or substantially moderate a legislative replacement.

State Notes

Alabama

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries can ship in care of a state liquor store, freight prepaid, if the customer has obtained Beverage Control Board approval and paid for the wine. Assessment (\$0.38 per liter) and excise taxes are payable on delivery to customer.

Direct Distribution: Recent adaptation of an agricultural cooperative law to allow in-state direct distribution by cooperating local wineries, following defeat of legislation to

⁴ Those interested in the legal details of stays may wish to examine FRCP 62(c) and *Cooper v. United States Postal Service*, 246 FRD 415, 417 (D. Conn. 2007), citing *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770 (1987), for trial court stays, and FRAP 8(a) and 45 Baylor L.Rev. 809 (1993) for appellate stays.

allow individual direct distribution, raises issues of access to retailers by out-of-state wineries under *Costco*.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Legislation: Senate Bill 127, which would have allowed direct shipments of wine to Alabama consumers, died in the Commerce, Transportation & Utilities Committee with *sine die* adjournment on May 15, 2009.

Alaska

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Out-of-state sellers and in-state wineries may ship to residents who are not in the liquor business and do not live in an interdicted community (list available from state, 907-269-0350). Carriers, however, reportedly do not serve all non-interdicted destinations; reportedly, FedEx added Ketchikan, Sitka, Valdez and Kodiak only in 2008. Out-of-state sellers are limited to “reasonable quantities” for personal use and consumption. Under the 2007 shipment statute, Alaska wineries have a 5-gallon limit per shipment. The new law does not appear to provide greater privileges for in-state wineries than for out-of-state wineries and therefore should not engender *Granholtm* challenge, even if the license is unavailable to out-of-state wineries, unless the state interprets “reasonable quantities” to mean substantially less than 5 gallons. Allowing out-of-state sellers more volume than local wineries would not raise Commerce Clause issues. According to statute, all liquor shipped into the state is taxable, even if the recipient is entitled to purchase liquor tax-free, but authorities reportedly have not attempted to tax direct shipments.

Arizona

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Any winery in the U.S. or in its possessions or territories may hold a “domestic farm winery” license (Series 13) if it produces no more than 40,000 and no fewer than 200 gallons per year, but the direct shipment privilege applies only to wineries producing up to 20,000 gallons annually. (The so-called “direct shipment license” is for three-tier distribution only.) Section 42-3356 of the revised statutes requires the Department of Liquor Licenses & Control to determine the amount of a tax bond, not less than \$500, based upon twice the projected annual liability, but domestic farm wineries are exempt after they have made twelve consecutive timely monthly payments. At last report, the agency was looking to the Department of Revenue to administer the tax bonds. See www.azliquor.gov/forms/pdf/outofstatedomesticfarmwinerybrewery.pdf for out-of-state winery forms. Reportedly, the Department of Liquor Licenses & Control has accepted license applications with “applied for” entered on the form in place of a Department of Revenue registration number for payment of the transaction privilege tax. In addition to the required state privilege taxes, shippers must pay sales tax, which is complicated by the status of “program cities” taxes (*i.e.*, cities whose local taxes are collected by the state Department of Revenue) and thirteen “non-program” cities (reportedly Apache Junction, Avondale, Chandler, Flagstaff, Glendale, Mesa, Nogales, Peoria, Phoenix, Prescott, Scottsdale, Tempe, and Tucson), whose taxes must be paid by direct shippers directly to each locality, thus requiring shippers to register separately with each destination non-program city, in addition to state registration.

On-site Sales: The statute apparently permits shipment without licensure, tax bonds, *etc.*, to a residential address of wine purchased at the winery by a person who “could have lawfully carried the wine into the state,” up to two cases per year for personal use. Reportedly, the regulatory agency considers shipments subsequent to, and in the same calendar year as, a winery visit to be purchases at the winery. Existing law appears to contemplate shipments to the purchaser, but not necessarily at the purchaser’s own address. Seemingly, the purchaser is not required to be an Arizona resident. Under current regulations and statutes, the only persons who can lawfully carry wine into the state are common carriers transporting the wine to licensed wholesalers and travelers returning from abroad with duty-free beverages, but the Department of Liquor License & Control reportedly interprets the “lawful carrier” requirement as satisfied by private means whenever the purchaser is at least 21 years of age.

Litigation: The complaint in a post-*Granholm* suit, *Black Star Farms, LLC v. Morrison*, originally challenging outright discrimination under the previous statute in favor of in-state wineries, was amended to charge discriminatory effects from the volume cap for farm wineries. (The Series 01 winery license for larger wineries is expressly referred to as an “in-state producer” license on the state domestic winery information page, www.azll.com/lic01.htm.) On February 26, 2008 the court ruled in favor of the state and the intervening wholesalers, leaving the volume cap in place. The case is now in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as *Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver*, where the plaintiffs’ filing of their reply brief on 14 May 2009 appears to have readied the case for scheduling argument. Different plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed a previous discrimination case, *Parker v. Morrison*, after the Department leveled down without benefit of legislation. The effect of the *Black Star* ruling is to legitimize the state’s restoring in-state privileges for the local industry while allowing only wineries that are no larger than its own to ship from outside the state, a system with similarities to the Massachusetts volume cap law invalidated in *Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins*.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Arkansas

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: There are no direct shipment provisions. Act 666 of the 2007 legislative session allows consumers who receive wine from outside the state to pay excise taxes directly to the Department of Finance and Administration, but does not create any new shipment or importation rights. Although carriers reportedly still accept shipments from in-state wineries, which arguably had direct shipment privileges for wine made from Arkansas produce as “native wineries” under a somewhat ambiguous 2005 amendment to state law intended to apply only to on-site sales, the legal basis is questionable. Act 668 of the same session repeals the native winery transportation privilege in an effort to end litigation by leveling down (see “Litigation,” below) and also ends the previous right of native wineries to ship to out-of-state purchasers by “common carrier or appropriate parcel delivery service.”

Direct Distribution: Act 668 of the 2007 session authorizes the state to license in-state and out-of-state “small farm wineries” as wholesalers for direct distribution, with a 250,000-gallon annual sales cap.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract for over-250,000-gallon wineries.

Litigation: On November 1, 2007, a federal judge dismissed *Beau v. Moore*, which had originally challenged discrimination in favor of native wineries that seemed clearly forbidden by *Granholm*. The federal judge had temporarily stayed the case pending resolution of a state suit brought by the wholesalers, *Moon Dist., Inc. v. Arkansas Dept. of Finance & Admin.* The *Moon* plaintiffs sought to level down, but the case was dismissed as moot after enactment of Act 668, which apparently was intended to accomplish the same objective. However, the *Beau* plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege discrimination based on the right of up-to-250,000-gallon wineries to sell directly to Arkansans at the winery premises, which practically favors local over distant sellers. The suit did not challenge the volume cap, which did not affect the plaintiff winery. The opinion follows the “no direct shipment market” theory in upholding on-site limits against challenges based on disproportionate impact on interstate commerce, under which a plaintiff must prove there was a trade in wine by direct shipment as to which the out-of-state seller suffered exclusion or burdening.

California

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery registered as out-of-state shipper (\$10 annual registration fee for applicants with no state license other than the required Type 82 out-of-state shipper’s permit) and as payer of state business taxes (annual reporting required) may ship to consumers without volume limits, subject to \$0.20/gal. excise and 7.25% use tax and posting a \$500 interim tax bond. A less useful alternative allows transportation from any U.S. location of up to one quart per year, either accompanying an adult passenger on board a chartered airplane on a flight entirely within the U.S. or shipped directly if the purchaser bought the wine at the winery. Winery shipper privileges are not limited to reciprocal states, but there are a limited reciprocal provision in the new law for shipments by retailers (see Litigation, below) and by individuals, and an older reciprocal provision for donations of wine to nonprofit tastings.

Litigation: A *Granholm*-based retailer suit, *Knightsbridge Wine Shoppe, LTD v. Jolly*, filed 26 April 2006 in the Northern District federal court, produced an agreement with the state through 2008 similar to the interim result in Texas, permitting out-of-state retailers delivery privileges equivalent to California retailers, without respect to reciprocity. On 5 January 2009, the parties agreed to dismissal, essentially on the grounds that the state as a matter of policy was not enforcing location-discriminatory laws. An earlier case, *Coulombe v. Jolly*, had been dismissed on the grounds the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they had not adopted a concrete wine sales plan that would violate the challenged statutes. A follow-on case, *Longstreet Delicatessen, Fine Wines & Specialty Coffees, L.L.C. v. Jolly*, was dismissed on similar grounds in September 2007.

Colorado

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding a \$50 out-of-state shipper permit may ship to a “personal consumer located in Colorado,” subject to \$0.80/gal. excise. Monthly tax reporting and submission to jurisdiction required. Permit applications can be downloaded from www.revenue.state.co.us/liquor_dir/pdfs/8475.pdf, but a state bulletin of

June 7, 2006 says no new application is required for a winery holding a current Wine Shipment Permit that was applied for before July 1, 2006.

Connecticut

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: The current winery shipper's permit replaces the old small winery shipper's permit, continuing the \$250 fee for up-to-100,000-gallon annual producers. Licensees consent to state jurisdiction and tax audits. Forms "REG-1 Business Taxes Registration," www.ct.gov/drs/lib/drs/forms/2006forms/applications/reg-1.pdf, and "Out of State Shipper's Permit," www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/forms/cplos-01.pdf, are available on-line. The code also contemplates qualifying to do business in the state (\$275 initial registration fee and \$300/yr. maintenance fee), but the Liquor Control Division is not requiring shippers to hold wholesale distributor or retail seller licenses or file monthly tax returns as a wholesaler or retailer, as might be suggested by ambiguous provisions in the current statute. Case content markings and adult signature are required, with criminal penalties for noncompliance. The licensee must conspicuously display its shipper's permit number or numbers in its on-line advertising. Shipment is limited to wine produced on the premises described in the shipper's permit, in quantities of up to five gallons (25 x 750-ml bottles, plus a couple of miniatures, a volumetric holdover from the old law) of a registered brand, via holder of a \$1000 in-state transporter's permit (which is not limited to common carriers, see www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/forms/cpltr-01.pdf), within any two-month period (changed on October 1, 2007 from 60-day periods to make calculation easier) to consumer at an address not within a dry township, subject to sales and excise taxes. Brand registration costs \$100, and each varietal or proprietary product is a separate brand; see www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/liquor/cplbd.pdf. The \$1000 general "out-of-state shipper's permit" and \$250 former "out-of-state small winery shipper's permit," heretofore required to ship to wholesalers and already held by some wineries, apparently now authorize shipment to consumers.

On-site sales: At last report, carriers were shipping wine purchased in person by the consignee, up to two cases per month. The legal basis for wineries that do not hold a state shipper's license is murky, as the federal direct shipment statute applies only to wine the purchaser could have imported personally under the laws of the state, and Connecticut law appears to limit such importations to five gallons per 365-day period.

Direct Distribution: Out-of-state wineries producing up to 100,000 gallons annually from at least 25% their own fruit now have the privilege, formerly limited to Connecticut "farm" wineries, to sell and ship directly to retailers in sizes not to exceed 56 liters per container.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract. Connecticut's general franchise law (the real franchise statute, with substantial requirements like those applicable to McDonald's, not the pseudo-franchise wholesaler protection legislation often called "franchise" in the wine industry) is of unusually broad application and may apply to ordinary sales through wholesalers.

Legislation: On May 20, 2009, Governor M. Jodi Rell signed SB 312, which allows holders of a manufacturer's permit for cider to ship to in-state and out-of-state consumers. The new law also amends certain wine festival provisions and the hours of sales and sampling for manufacturers of wine. The bill was effective upon signature for

all amendments except the changes to the sales and sampling of wine on the premises of wine manufacturers, which will go into effect July 1, 2009. Other shipment bills died with *sine die* adjournment on June 3, 2009: SB 322 would have changed brand registration to make direct shipping easier for out-of-state wineries; SB 516 would have allowed in-state wineries to deliver the same amount as out-of-state wineries.

Delaware

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute and Delaware personal importation law, a winery may ship up to 1 liter per day (4 liters if from American Samoa, Guam, or American Virgin Islands) from anywhere in the state where it is located, to any person in Delaware at least 21 years old, not mentally ill or deficient, who does not habitually drink alcohol to excess and is not interdicted by the state, adult signature required, if the wine was purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery, for any purpose other than resale, or any amount for consumption solely by the importing person or that person's family or guests. Personal importations are subject to excise tax; the state directs importing individuals to notify the Department of Revenue by email to William.Kirby@state.de.us.

Litigation: On April 12, 2007, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of its previous order to dismiss a federal suit, *Hurley v. Minner*, which challenges restrictions on direct shipment. The ruling abandoned the court's 2006 finding that because the state required consumers to pick up Delaware wine at the winery, the special order provisions requiring them to pick up out-of-state wine at a local retail licensee (see "Three-tier Distribution," below) was permissible under *Granholm*. A direct distribution count in the complaint was dismissed by agreement on August 25, 2006 because level-down legislation rendered it moot. The remainder of the suit was dismissed by stipulation on January 8, 2008.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract between wineries and wholesalers. A special order provision appears to allow a consumer to initiate a shipment of wine from an out-of-state winery that holds a "Direct Shipper License" (not to be confused with the recently proposed "Wine Direct Shipper License" described under "Legislation," below) for successive delivery to a wholesaler and a retailer, for pickup by the purchaser.

Legislation: The Delaware Legislature adjourns *sine die* on June 30, 2009, making it extremely unlikely that any action will be taken on House Bill 180. The measure, now in the Economic Development, Banking, Insurance & Commerce Committee, would make any business licensed in any U.S. state as a wine producer eligible to hold a "Wine Direct Shipper License," permitting shipment via a permit-holding carrier of up to 24 cases of wine annually directly to any resident of Delaware at least 21 years old for personal use and not for resale.

District of Columbia

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries may ship directly to any consumer of age to purchase, by public or common carriers, up to one case per month per recipient.

On-site Sales: Under federal direct shipment statute, a winery may also ship from anywhere in the state where it is located, to a consumer (adult signature required) in the

District, up to one gallon purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery.

Direct Distribution: Wineries may ship directly to retailers who hold importation permits for the brand, which the D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board issues only if it is satisfied that the brand is not obtainable by the licensee from a wholesaler in the District in sufficient quantity to reasonably satisfy the immediate needs of the licensee. The retailer must pay excise tax.

Florida

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: An example of law-making by litigation, Florida has been operating under policy directives of the Department of Business & Professional Regulation, necessitated by the August 5, 2005 federal district court order in *Bainbridge v. Turner*. The court ruled, with the state's consent, that prohibition of direct shipment was unconstitutional under *Granholm* for discriminating in favor of in-state wineries and refused the wholesalers' request to cure discrimination by invalidating the in-state direct shipment statute. The case was dismissed by stipulation on October 18, 2005, apparently having achieved its purpose. The policy announced February 16, 2006 allows shipment directly to consumers via common carrier, with monthly payment of tax. The court did not specify procedures for payment of the \$2.25/gal. excise, the 6% sales tax, or other potential regulatory issues or enjoin the state from enforcing penalties for non-payment of tax. In an informal discussion in September 2005, the Department's attorney said that express companies such as FedEx and UPS are considered exempt as common carriers from vehicle permit requirements and may deliver for manufacturers (notwithstanding an earlier attorney general opinion to the contrary). Shortly thereafter, the Department began issuing periodic reports that new administrative rules were in process, but they never appeared. Subsequently, it concluded that legislation is required. In mid-2007 the Department removed its web site description of acceptable direct shipment procedure under *Bainbridge*, an accommodation it described as "not legally binding." That action caused concern that the Department would bow to wholesaler pressure to discontinue the current arrangement (for example, by leveling down in administrative rule-making), following the legislature's failure to act. The Department of Business & Professional Regulation Audit Bureau originally appeared to support a restrictive policy by declaring in an April 2007 press release that it lacks statutory authority to track, audit and collect taxes on direct wine shipments from outside the state (a debatable proposition), but the governor reportedly directed maintenance of the status quo. Efforts in each session to formalize shipping rules have failed to pass a bill, leaving the informal direct shipment privilege in place.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Florida, up to one gallon per shipment.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Legislation: Two direct-to-consumer measures for the 2009 legislative session died in committees upon final adjournment on May 2. Senate Bill 764/HB 245 would have

required an annual \$250 fee, a \$1,000 to \$5000 surety bond, a 250,000-gallon annual production cap and a 12-case/yr per consumer shipping limit. Senate Bill 272/HB 251 had no production or shipment limits, and lower license and bond fees at \$100 and \$500-\$1000, respectively.

Georgia

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding a special order shipping license may ship up to 12 cases of brand-registered wine to a state resident, subject to \$1.51 state excise and 4% sales tax and to an age verification requirement that in effect mandates an on-line system (see “Age & Identity Verification Systems” under **Notes Applicable to Multiple States**, above), without bond or territorial designation; additional sales through local distributors are optional.

On-site Sales: State law permits shipment directly to consumer who has placed order in person at winery premises, free of excise tax, not to exceed five cases per order.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Hawaii

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: The islands are separate counties with their own regulatory agencies, which have historically differed somewhat in procedures. A winery holding a county Direct Wine Shipper Permit may ship up to six cases per household per year to consumers in that county (although there have been inconsistent interpretations regarding a possible state maximum), subject to excise taxes. Tax payment requires a General Excise Tax License, which is issued by the Department of Taxation after the winery files a Basic Business Application. See forms under “Relevant Documents” at <http://wi.shipcompliant.com> (by clicking on the “State Shipping Laws” header and then on Hawaii). The current permit procedures, which became mandatory on January 1, 2007, have not thus far produced complete consistency. Maui County requires a copy of the federal basic permit; Kauai and Hawaii Counties require a copy of the state winery license. Permits for Maui and Hawaii Counties cost \$48; Honolulu County’s permit costs \$120. All counties require excise tax registration on form BB-1. A preexisting provision independently authorizes shipment directly to a consumer holding an importation permit from a county liquor commission, not to exceed one 5-gallon shipment per household per calendar year (plus unsolicited gifts not exceeding 3.2 gallons each), for use of the permittee or permittee’s family. Importation permit applicants must demonstrate to the issuing liquor commission that the product is otherwise unavailable in the state or pay an additional fee equivalent to the excise tax.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Hawaii, up to one gallon per shipment.

Idaho

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding a \$50 shipping permit (\$1000 tax bond required) may ship up to 24 cases annually to a resident consumer, subject to sales

and excise taxes and a somewhat burdensome annual shipment report specifying invoice number, order type and sale type, purchase date and ship date, buyer's name and address, shipped-to name and address, date of birth for buyer and for recipient, brand and product description, alcohol percentage, number of bottles, volume per bottle, total price of wine and tax charged, and invoice total. Separate sales tax form is required for sales made to Nez Perce County residents. A permit is available to retailers in reciprocal states, but because the restriction is probably invalid under *Granholm*, that arrangement does not appear reliable for the long run.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Illinois

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries may obtain a permit, with sliding scale fees from \$150 to \$1000, based on capacity, authorizing direct shipment of up to 12 cases per year to a single customer. See ShipCompliant's [Illinois posting](#) and [Illinois checklist](#) for details.

On-site Sales: A question exists whether Illinois has any a general prohibition on importation by consumers, as the statutory prohibition appears to apply only to shipment or transportation initiated from outside the state. To the extent residents may themselves lawfully import wine for personal use (an unsettled matter), wineries could in theory ship in-person purchases to them under the federal direct shipment law, independently of the direct shipment statute. According to a 1974 Attorney General Opinion, the Commission lacks jurisdiction over importations by residents for their personal use, although by unpublished policy, personal importation of over 1 gallon per year of wine not authorized by the direct shipment statutes without written permission of Liquor Control Commission would be deemed not for personal use.

Direct Distribution: The direct shipment permit also allows direct distribution of up to 5,000 gallons per year by under-25,000-gallon annual production wineries.

Three-tier Distribution: The state follows the Uniform Commercial Code, but requires registration of distributors.

Litigation: Out-of-state retailers have threatened suit under *Granholm* because of their ineligibility for a permit to ship to consumers under the new direct shipment law. A state court suit *Raimondi v. Koppel*, in which an Italian winery apparently seeks to level down by enjoining in-state wineries from direct distribution, is based on the Illinois Constitution's equal protection clause and prohibition of special interest legislation, rather than *Granholm*. No substantive rulings are reported.

Legislation: House Bill 2462, which would license retailers for direct shipment, was referred for the second time to the Rules Committee on 13 March 2009. The legislature adjourned on 31 May 2009 and will reconvene in January 2010. Reportedly, the bill will have to be reintroduced for consideration in the reconvened session.

Indiana

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Out-of-state wineries that have not distributed through an Indiana wholesaler in the past 120 days or produced annually more than 100,000

gallons can apply for a direct wine seller's permit. Wineries that are subsidiaries, parents, or affiliates of other wineries (or of brewers or distillers) are ineligible. Permit holders may ship a total of up to 3,000 cases per year per winery to consumers in the state *who have previously purchased on-site*, not to exceed 24 cases in a calendar year to any single customer *from all wineries*, but appear to become ineligible to maintain the permit if they sell to an Indiana wholesaler after issuance. According to the statute, wineries that hold a "license to wholesale" issued by any jurisdiction, *i.e.*, most wineries, assuming a winery license allowing direct distribution is a license to wholesale, are ineligible for the permit, but that provision was held invalid in the *Baude* case (see "Litigation," below). On October 15, 2007, the Commission announced it would not take action against a winery whose shipment puts a consumer over the aggregate limit if (1) the holder of the direct wine seller's permit has not directly shipped in excess of 216 liters within the calendar year to the particular Indiana consumer; (2) the direct wine seller has no actual knowledge that the particular consumer has received in excess of 216 liters within the calendar year; and (3) at the time of the sale transaction, the consumer represented to the direct wine seller that the sale would not result in the consumer's receiving in excess of 216 liters in the calendar year.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship from anywhere in the state where it is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Indiana up to one quart of wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery. On-site sale of a larger quantity would require a shipper permit; at least one on-site sale must precede any direct shipment of an order not placed in person. (The law is unclear on whether the sale must be of wine, but the in-person age verification requirement applies, so wineries should record particulars of ID-checking, regardless of what was purchased.)

Retailer Direct Shipment: Reportedly, Department of Revenue authorities have said informally that out-of-state wine stores can ship on the same terms as out-of-state wineries if they follow the same rules, but the statute appears to require that a shipping retailer also manufacture wine, and there is no reported instance of the state Alcohol & Tobacco Commission's issuing a permit to a non-producing retailer.

Direct Distribution: A "micro-wholesaler" (up to 12,000 gallons annual sales) permit (\$100/yr.) has no express location requirement. In an informal opinion, the state regulatory agency indicated it would issue the license to an out-of-state winery that either has never previously held a wine wholesaler's permit and anticipates selling less than 12,000 gallons of wine and brandy in a year or, if it previously held a wine wholesaler's permit, certifies that it sold less than that amount in the previous year. By statute, the wholesale operation can be on farm winery premises and can use goods and services provided by the farm winery, suggesting that wineries licensed as micro-wholesalers will be subject to the 500,000-gallon cap on the total of direct shipment and direct distribution sales in the state.

Litigation: On 18 May 2009, the Supreme Court declined to review the 7 August 2008 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the federal suit, *Baude v. Heath*, which declared unconstitutional one aspect of the Indiana statute, but upheld the on-site initial purchase requirement. The invalid portion of the statute rendered most out-of-state wineries ineligible for the "direct wine seller's permit," which the statute would have

limited to in-state wineries and to out-of-state wineries in the few states that do not grant them local wholesaling privileges. The case does not address the recent statutory change disqualifying wineries with Indiana wholesaler relationships from direct shipment; a similar Massachusetts provision that fell disproportionately on out-of-state wineries was condemned in *Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins*. In an earlier Indiana suit, *Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson*, brought on grounds similar to *Baude v. Heath*, the same appellate judge sustained then-current state law on the theory it requires “every drop” of wine, without discrimination between in-state and out-of-state shippers, to go through the three-tier system, although it is questionable whether that was ever the case. The lower court in *Baude v. Heath* specifically found that Indiana law allows in-state wineries to sell directly to consumers and retailers, thereby discriminating against interstate commerce. On May 20, 2005, the Commission warned Indiana wineries by letter that in its view in-state shipment to consumers is prohibited, but on November 15, 2005, nine Indiana wineries filed *Thomas Family Winery v. Heath*, a state suit challenging that interpretation, and on November 23, 2005, the state court enjoined enforcement of the putative prohibition, pending resolution of the issue by legislative action. The preliminary injunction supported local direct shipment only until April 6, 2006, and appears to have been supplanted by the current statute, which was only partly invalidated in *Baude v. Heath* (see “Winery Direct Shipment Basics,” above). *Thomas Family Winery* was dismissed as part of the compromise with the wholesalers that made that legislation possible, although it is difficult to ascertain what the wineries gained thereby. Indiana has a history of resisting Commerce Clause claims. In 2003, the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, which was reportedly considering whether to permit “farm wineries” (producing under 500,000 gallons and using Indiana fruit) to exercise their on-site sales privilege by shipping to consumers who purchase by electronic means or mail, put the project on hold to await the decision in *Granholm*. The Commission’s public statements at the time implied it would not allow direct shipment for any winery unless *Granholm* permitted extending the privilege only to in-state wineries, which of course did not occur.

Legislation: The legislature adjourned *sine die* on 29 April 2009. Among bills that did not survive: HB 1281, a hybrid wholesale and self-distribution bill; SB 332, eliminating face-to-face requirements and extending direct shipment to retailers; SB 333, replacing face-to-face requirements with third party verification service and allowing limited self-distribution.

Iowa

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery licensed in a state that affords Iowa wineries an “equal reciprocal shipping privilege” may ship eighteen liters per month to an individual for personal use by common carrier. The right of wineries in non-reciprocal states to ship to Iowa consumers is unclear, and carrier policies at last report were inconsistent, permitting shipments to fulfill all orders from some non-reciprocal states and limiting others to on-site only. Reports of state policy on reconciling the conflicting requirements of the state statute and the Commerce Clause have been inconclusive.

Kansas

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Effective 1 July 2009, any wine “producer or maker” holding a federal basic permit for “manufacturing” wine may obtain a “special order shipping license” (\$50 registration, \$10 annual renewal) that authorizes direct shipment of 12 cases of wine per year to a Kansas consumer for “personal or household use” within the state. The statute bristles with unusual qualifications and specifications on matters such as delivery charges and state tax calculation. Age verification requirements practically mandate use of an electronic service (see “Age & Identify Verification” at page 5, above). Volume-based excise tax returns are annual, but other state taxes may be subject to different requirements by regulation. **Note:** Through 30 June 2009, wineries producing no more than 100,000 gallons annually and holding a direct shipping permit may ship wine to a Kansas retailer for delivery to consumers who are not purchasing face-to-face (including, presumably, those ordering via Internet or phone), with \$5 pickup fee; larger wineries may ship to a Kansas wholesaler for transshipment to a Kansas retailer, who then delivers to the off-site purchasing consumer, who must pay all shipping costs.

On-site Sales: All wineries may ship wine directly to consumers at least 21 years old who made the purchase at the winery for personal consumption, subject to excise tax, annual reporting of shipment, and consent to tax audits.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract. However, wine shipped under the pre-July 2009 indirect consumer shipment statute is not sold to the wholesaler or retailer and therefore may not subject the shipping winery to special supplier-wholesaler legislation. Wineries should obtain legal advice before shipping to a retailer under the pre-July 2009 system and before shipping to a wholesaler under any circumstances.

Kentucky

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Out-of-state and in-state wineries holding “small farm winery” licenses (\$100/yr.), which are limited to producers of up to 50,000 gallons in any calendar year, may ship to consumers by licensed common carrier. Under a federal district court ruling of December 26, 2006, the state cannot enforce its on-site requirement, although the two-case “per visit” limit was not invalidated. At last report, carriers were providing only intrastate shipments of on-site sales.

Direct Distribution: The state has revoked self-distribution by small farm wineries, presumably to avert a *Costco* challenge to prohibition on direct distribution from outside the state. The current law creates a “small farm winery wholesaler” license, but it cannot be held by a small farm winery. In August 2006, the federal court ruled against an attempt to open the state to direct distribution, finding the plaintiffs had not demonstrated direct and harmful discrimination.

Three-tier Distribution: The state will subsidize no-markup distribution of small farm winery products, provided the winery can find a Kentucky wholesaler willing to participate in the program.

Litigation: On December 24, 2008 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly* (formerly *Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins*) affirmed the

federal district court's judgment entered almost exactly two years earlier, enjoining the state from enforcing the on-site-only requirement of its direct shipment law, which permits all wineries meeting a 50,000-gallon production cap to hold Kentucky "small farm winery" licenses. The ruling has broad significance because it challenges illusory equality that conceals *de facto* discrimination and recognizes that, because wines from different regions are distinct, availability of local wines does not cure practical difficulty in exercise of consumers' right of access to distant producers under *Granholm*. The court, however, upheld other aspects of the new law. The winery and consumer plaintiffs had also challenged two restrictions on small farm winery licensees, (1) that the license is available only to wineries producing no more than 50,000 gallons annually, and (2) that wineries may ship no more than two cases "per visit." The court decided both restrictions were constitutionally permissible because the inequities arose from "mere geographic happenstance," but did not describe how to find the line between happenstance and an impermissibly protectionist system in a *de facto* discrimination case.

Louisiana

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A producing winery holding a shipping permit (\$150 "annual tax") and having no relationship with any Louisiana wholesaler may ship up to 60 bottles (any size) per year to a consumer, routing a copy of a detailed invoice to the state, subject to a volume limitation of forty-eight 750-ml bottles per year to any single "household address." The shipping winery must report monthly the number of cases shipped into the state and pay the excise and sales taxes for all wine shipped.

On-site Sales: If the shipping winery is a direct or indirect party to an agreement that granted a Louisiana wholesaler the right to purchase and sell any of its wines, its sale of any wine to be shipped to the consumer in the state must have been "perfected" (which may or may not mean an in-person purchase) on the "domicile" (usually, but not necessarily, the production premises) of the winery.

Direct Distribution: The "Wine Producers Act" eliminated direct distribution by in-state wineries, to protect the prohibition on sales to retailers by out-of-state wineries against challenge under *Granholm*. In December 2006, the Louisiana Office of Alcohol & Tobacco Control obtained a consent decree, enjoining a New Jersey tobacco wholesale operation from distributing tobacco products directly to retail outlets in Louisiana. The same agency has enforcement responsibility for the current wine law.

Legislation: The legislature is scheduled to adjourn on 25 June 2009, making it virtually impossible to take action on SB 737, to cut off direct shipment by out-of-state retailers, which has been in Judiciary Committee B since 27 April 2009.

Maine

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: According to "An Act to Increase Consumer Choice for Wine," signed 12 June 2009, an U.S. winery holding the Maine "wine direct shipper license" may ship wine of its own production other than coolers by common carrier directly to consumers, subject to state excise and "premium" taxes and quarterly reporting of shipments. The Liquor Licensing & Tax Division will set the application fee for the license at not more than \$200; to use the license, an additional \$100 registration fee is required. Annual renewal is \$50. Registration involves submission to state

jurisdiction for taxation and other enforcement, and the license requires providing copies of any records the state requests with 10 days of request. For shipment until the Bureau of Liquor Enforcement adopts regulations and issues licenses, see “On-site Sales,” below.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Maine. The statutory limit of one gallon per transportation into the state can be waived by the Bureau of Revenue Services upon special application by the resident.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: The failed attempt to force direct shipment by litigation in *Cherry Hill Vineyard v. Baldacci* has been rendered moot by passage of a statute (see “Legislation,” below). The First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion remains more notable for use (and misuse) of uncommon terms like “perscrutation” and “limn” than for rigor of analysis in its October 11, 2007 affirmation of the March 5, 2007 federal district court judgment in favor of the state. The decision is based on the grounds that the face-to-face restriction applies equally to in-state and out-of-state small wineries, both of which can be licensed in Maine, and that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of any off-site order local market that is available to in-state wineries but denied to out-of-state wineries. The plaintiffs’ strategy (probably dictated by economic factors) of submitting the appeal on a relatively sparse agreed record prevented consideration of economic burdens resulting from facially neutral legislation.

Legislation: The perennial attempt at a direct shipment law bore fruit in the 2009 session, with passage of LD 1008 (HP 696) on June 5th. See “Winery Direct Shipment Basics,” above. Two other direct shipment bills, HP 911 and SP 389, died when the legislature adjourned on 17 June 2009.

Maryland

Three-tier Distribution: An out-of-state winery that has not held, and in which no one holding any financial interest has held, any other Maryland alcoholic beverage license or permit within the past 2 years may hold a \$10 “direct wine seller” permit, to sell wine of which it is the brand owner, U.S. importer, or designated agent of the brand owner, and which is not being distributed by a Maryland wholesaler and was not distributed in the state during the two years preceding the winery’s permit application, to residents for personal consumption, subject to an annual sales limit of 900 liters for all Maryland residents and 108 liters for any single Maryland resident. An annual excise tax return is required. Direct shipment is prohibited, as the wine must be delivered, freight prepaid, to a Maryland wholesaler, for redelivery to a Maryland retailer, before reaching the purchaser, who must pay, if asked by the delivering licensees, a fee up to \$14 per shipment. For conventional sales through wholesalers, the state has not enacted systematic restraints on freedom of contract, but some state statutes are ambiguous regarding possible effect on supplier-wholesaler relations.

Direct Distribution: Holder of Nonresident Winery Permit (\$50, available only to licensed wineries producing no more than 27,500 gallons annually) may ship directly to restaurants, off-sale retailers, and certain other permit holders.

Legislation: House Bill 1262 and companion SB 338 died in the Senate Education, Health & Environmental Affairs Committee hearings when the legislature adjourned on 13 April 2009. The bills would have established a \$100 permit for wineries, retailers, importers and brand owners to ship up to 24 cases per year to a consumer in a wet area.

Massachusetts

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: According to statute, in-state and out-of-state wineries may ship to consumers under a \$100 shipment license that is available to applicants producing 30,000 gallons or more annually only if they have been free of contractual relationships with Massachusetts wholesalers during the preceding six months. However, the state has been enjoined from applying the volume cap, leaving wineries of all sizes eligible for the license whether or not they also sell through Massachusetts wholesalers (see "Litigation," below.) At last report, major carriers continued to make only intra-state deliveries.

Direct Distribution: An up-to-30,000 gallon winery holding the shipment license may sell to Massachusetts retailers, with certain limitations (*e.g.*, no more than 250 cases per year to any off-sale account).

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: On October 17, 2005, the federal district court entered judgment for plaintiffs in a post-*Granholm* federal suit, *Stonington Vineyards, Inc. v. Jenkins*, overturning prohibition of direct shipment to Massachusetts consumers and retailers on grounds of discrimination against interstate commerce. The court enjoined the state from enforcing state statutes "so as to prohibit out-of-state wineries from selling and shipping wine directly to consumers and licensed retail wine sellers in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." The state's adoption of a successor direct shipment law, replacing location discrimination with a volume cap, passed on February 15, 2006 by legislative override of the governor's veto, may have mooted the injunction, but administrative issues and validity of the volume cap remained unresolved. Filed on September 18, 2006, the *Granholm*-based federal suit, *Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins*, challenged subjecting larger wineries, which were exclusively out-of-state, to a volume cap and to ineligibility if they also sell through wholesalers, while affording smaller wineries, a category for which all in-state wineries qualified, "unfettered access" to Massachusetts consumers. On December 18, 2006 the court denied the state wholesaler trade association's motion to intervene, and on May 16, 2008 it denied the state's long-pending motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On November 19, 2008 the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and ordered the state to discontinue applying the volume cap to force larger wineries to choose between engaging wholesalers and using direct shipment. On December 18, 2008 the court entered final judgment, with an injunction in accordance with its November order. The state filed its notice of appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on January 16, 2009. As of 11 June 2009, the case had been briefed in the Court of Appeals, including amicus briefs filed by wholesaler and

winery associations, but the court had not set a date for oral argument. Thus far, none of the appellants has requested a stay of the lower court judgment.

Legislation: Senate Bill 176, filed on 10 January 2009, would enact a conventional direct shipment licensing law without a volume cap. House Bill 317, filed three days later, has similar provisions and is in the Joint Committee on Consumer Protection & Professional Licensure. The legislature is in the first year of its two year session, which began in January 2009.

Michigan

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: After several postponements, Michigan, a losing party in *Granholm*, produced what might be termed a grudging acceptance statute in purported compliance with the Supreme Court decision. A winery holding a Direct Shipper license and registered with the state Department of Treasury may ship to consumers in the state. Restrictions include a 1500-case annual limit per winery or group of commonly managed wineries, a \$100 annual license for out-of-state wineries, quarterly excise tax returns with shipment history details, both an underage delivery warning and a special label on the carton with the license number, a requirement to use an age-verification specialist approved by the Commission or receive a faxed copy of the purchaser's driver's license, a requirement to retain transaction records, and consent to state jurisdiction and tax audits. Senders of email that offers wine or contains a link to a site offering wine must comply with 2005 Public Act 241, which provides penalties for email sent to an underage recipient whose address is on a state registry. The state fee for checking winery email lists against the registry is \$0.007 per address.

Retailer Direct Shipment: In a spectacular display of fast-tracked special interest legislation, HB 6644 was introduced on 12 November 2008 in response to the *Siesta Village* decision (see "Litigation," below) and signed by the governor on 9 January 2009. The statute appears to preserve delivery privileges of local retailers by allowing retailer direct shipment only if delivery is by the retailer's own employee (except for recipients on islands inaccessible by motor vehicles). Because exclusion of contract carriers clearly burdens out-of-state retailers more than local retailers, the feature invites *Granholm*-based litigation.

On-site Winery Sales: Under federal direct shipment statute, wineries may ship from anywhere in the state where selling winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Michigan, under-21% wine purchased for personal use while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery, up to 312 oz. (about a case plus a split) per importation. An oddity of state law also allows on-site purchasers at U.S. wineries who, before flying to Michigan, go abroad for more than 48 hours to ship, at intervals of more than 30 days between trips, any amount federally permitted as personal importation (not, apparently, limited to the duty-free two liters). Federal law imposes no specific volume limit on duty-paid personal importations if the quantity is consistent with not "engaging in the business" of importing. Perhaps some enterprising high-margin winery will offer a two-day side trip to Puerto Vallarta or Victoria as part of its VIP case buyer program.

Direct Distribution: The current law leaves direct sales to retailers in place only for in-state wineries, unless a court finds the discrimination unconstitutional, in which case it repeals the in-state privilege.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: On September 30, 2008, the federal district court in *Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Granholm* ordered Michigan to give out-of-state retailers access to Michigan consumers to whom local retailers could deliver wine, but the parties agreed to a stay of the ruling pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit. The trial court's reasoning closely parallels that of *Granholm v. Heald*, extending the "level playing field" concept from wineries to non-producing retailers. However, opponents managed to obtain a legislative change (see "Retail Direct Shipment," above) while the appeal was pending, to render the decision moot by leveling down if *Granholm* applies. By agreement filed 18 May 2009, the parties consented to returning the case to the district court for relief from the judgment, in effect setting aside the original injunction (which had never taken effect) and ending the case.

Minnesota

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Out-of-state wineries may ship up to two cases per year to a consumer. By statute, the sales are not deemed to occur in Minnesota; winery sales terms locating the sale in the seller's state should therefore be effective. A gross receipts tax of 2.5% on sales by "liquor retailers" became effective January 1, 2006, but is of uncertain application to out-of-state sellers and, even if applicable, allows credit for home state gross receipts taxes. In May 2009, the state sent letters to directly shipping wineries, referring to a monthly shipment reporting requirement that appears to apply only to wineries shipping to Minnesota wholesalers, but at last report the matter had not been clarified.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: On April 3, 2006 the court in *Crockett v. Champion* entered a consent decree that wineries have the a 1st and 14th Amendment right "to engage in truthful, non-misleading advertising and solicitation of direct sales and shipments of wine to Minnesotan consumers" and to "initiate and/or accept online orders for sales and shipments of wine placed by Minnesotan consumers via the Internet." For the text of the decree, see www.dps.state.mn.us/alcgamb/alcgamb_files/show_case_doc.pdf.

Legislation: House Bill 478 and its companion SB 31, would have removed the direct shipment advertising restrictions invalidated in *Crockett*. The bills died in committee when the legislature adjourned *sine die* on 18 May 2009.

Mississippi

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Prohibited. The state has expressly restricted in-state winery consumer sales to the winery location, to avert *Granholm* arguments based on a reading of state law that would permit in-state direct shipment.

Three-tier Distribution: Importation and distribution is a state monopoly.

Legislation: House Bill 262 and the similar SB 2741 would have allowed manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, and retailers to ship wine to Mississippi retailers for consumer pickup, if the wine listed for sale in state stores, subject to special taxes and markups. The bills died in committee at adjournment on 4 April 2009.

Missouri

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries may obtain a permit to ship 2 cases per month to a consumer, subject to excise tax. A permit with similar privileges is available to retailers in states that have entered into reciprocal agreements with the Missouri regulatory agency; as such agreements are condemned by *Granholm*, it seems unlikely the arrangement will remain in force long term. The carrier must hold a separate permit to deliver to a consumer.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: A *Granholm*-based federal suit, *Burack v. Lobdell* (formerly titled *A. Rafanelli Winery & Vineyards, LP v. Lobdell*), challenging the pre-August 8, 2007 reciprocal law, was voluntarily dismissed on October 2, 2007.

Montana

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery registered with Montana as a “foreign winery” may ship directly to a consumer holding a “connoisseur’s” permit, using a shipping label provided by customer, not to exceed 12 cases per year to a single customer and 60 cases per year for all recipients in the state. The state requires listing distributors, if any, and consumer customers if there are no distributors, on the registration form, but reportedly does not regulate allocation of sales between direct shipment and three-tier, except for imposing the 60-case annual limit on the former. Complicated limits and criminal penalties for non-willful violations by wineries or brewers may make the permit impractical; FedEx does not show the state as a permissible destination for off-site sales.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Montana, not to exceed 3 gallons per importation.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Direct Distribution: Winery licenses are not location-restricted and include the right to self-distribute. Licensed out-of-state wineries that have reached their 60-case aggregate annual limit under connoisseur permits may route wine to their Montana connoisseurs through Montana retailers.

Nebraska

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries holding S-1 shipper’s licenses (\$500 annual fee) may ship directly to consumers for personal use of recipient or recipient’s family or guests, not to exceed 9 liters per month to any one recipient (or possibly family), subject to excise tax.

Three-tier Distribution: State statutory restraints on freedom of contract may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.

Nevada

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: With some peculiar qualifications, a winery may ship wine “for household or personal use” directly to a consumer who receives no more than 12 cases per year from all winery sources combined. It is unclear whether wineries may safely rely on customer representations of their total annual received shipments. The shipping winery must hold a shipping license (\$50/yr.) and pay an importer license fee if it ships 200 or more cases per year. Wineries shipping 25 cases or more in any fiscal year must designate a Nevada importer. Although the statute does not require shipping wineries to sell any wine to the importer, supplier-importer relationships raise significant legal issues; consultation with counsel is recommended before exceeding the 25-case level.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Nevada, not to exceed 1 gallon per month or any federally duty-free amount, tax-free, limited to household or personal use.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

New Hampshire

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding a “direct shipper” permit may ship to consumers via licensed carriers, limited to 60 bottles (one liter or less each) to any one customer in a calendar year. Direct shipper licensees must file monthly reports and are required to offer to the commission any direct sale items that have been listed with the commission within the preceding 2 months or of which more than 100 cases have been shipped into the state.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in New Hampshire, up to three quarts per importation (3 gallons with permit from State Liquor Commission).

Three-tier Distribution: Importation is a state monopoly.

Legislation: Senate Bill 181 would allow manufacturers, importers, wholesalers, and retailers to ship directly to consumers, subject to a 10% sales fee payable to the State Liquor Commission. Other provisions of the bill include those that address advertisements and corkage fees. The bill was re-referred to the Ways & Means committee on 8 April 2009. House Bill 636, which would have created a direct shipping license for wineries, was effectively removed from consideration on 4 March 2009. The current legislative session adjourns next year, on a date to be determined.

New Jersey

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: New Jersey exhibits both an odd collection of wine importation statutes and a remarkable gap between text and practice. Theoretically, wineries may ship to consumers via a licensed beverage transporter with payment of tax,

under a permit issued by Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, but the Division refuses to issue the permits.

On-site Sales: Two provisions of state law may be relevant to application of the federal direct shipment statute. One allows personal importation in a vehicle under control of the consumer, up to 1 gallon within a 24-hour period, but only from a state allowing similar importation of alcoholic beverages purchased in New Jersey, a limitation that is questionable under *Granholm*. The other allows a consumer reentering the state to bring wine into the state under a \$25 permit issued by Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, for personal consumption, with no stated volume limit (but possibly a practical requirement that it be consistent with personal use). Each presents some uncertainty. At least one carrier accepts shipments of up to one gallon purchased in an on-site sale, but the requirement in the one-gallon statute that importation without a permit be in a vehicle under control of the consumer does not fit the federal direct shipment model, which is based on allowing shipment of wine that could otherwise be transported lawfully as airline luggage. Importation with a permit would increase the allowed volume, but does not seem commercially practical, and whether the state would issue a permit for shipment under the federal statute is presently unknown.

Direct Distribution: In response to wholesaler fears that the discrimination might result in court-mandated direct shipment, the state repealed in-state direct shipment provisions on July 14, 2004, but gave in-state wineries rights to additional sales sites that are not available to other producers.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: A June 30, 2008 leveling-down decision in the federal case, *Freeman v. McGreevey*, terminated in-state direct shipment for New Jersey wineries because it was unavailable to out-of-state wineries, upheld as non-discriminatory a requirement that both in-state and out-of-state wineries sell to consumers only from physical locations within New Jersey, and required the state to charge in-state and out-of-state wineries the same license fee for the privilege. The ruling is stayed pending the plaintiffs' appeal to the Third Circuit, where the case is entitled *Freeman v. Governor of New Jersey* and is defended by the wholesalers without participation by the state. The matter has been briefed and will be considered by the panel the week of 7 September 2009; oral argument will likely be requested and granted.

Legislation: Companion direct shipment bills SB 1810 and AB 2656 have not moved since being referred respectively to Senate Law & Public Safety & Veterans' Affairs Committee on 15 May 2008 and to Assembly Law & Public Safety Committee on 12 May 2008. The current legislative session is scheduled to adjourn on 12 January 2010. The bills impose no quantity or frequency limits, require annual excise and sales tax return with payment by relatively inconvenient certified check, rather than bank draft or cashier's check, and shipment by parcel delivery service approved by the director of the Division of Taxation, subject to penalty of up to six months' incarceration for underage delivery; license fees are \$50 for in-state and \$100 for out-of-state wineries.

New Mexico

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries in reciprocal states may ship directly to consumers, not to exceed two cases per month for a single customer. Prohibition of shipments from other states is of questionable validity under *Granholm*. Remarkably, another state law appears to allow a consumer who is not a minor to import reasonable amounts exclusively for private use or consumption, independently of the reciprocal shipment statute, without a requirement of personal transportation.

On-site Sales: Even if the consumer importation provision noted above is limited to personal transportation, it should provide a basis for shipment under the federal direct shipment statute without the two-case limit, but carriers reportedly limit shipments to two cases for the aggregate of on-site and off-site sales.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

New York

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Ironically, although New York was the defendant in *Swedenburg v. Kelly*, the companion case decided by the Supreme Court in *Granholm*, it “fixed” the unconstitutionality of its direct shipment ban by enacting a quasi-reciprocal law that is itself probably unconstitutional under *Granholm*. Reportedly, the legislative sponsors were aware of the flaw, but accepted it because anti-commerce legislators would not vote for the bill without it. In any event, it is the statute currently in force and allows a winery licensed and located in a state that, in the State Liquor Authority’s opinion, affords New York wineries substantially equivalent privileges to obtain a New York out-of-state direct shipper’s license (\$125/yr.), authorizing shipment of up to 36 cases per year to a consumer for personal use, via licensed carrier, subject to state and local excise and sales taxes. (The list of qualifying states is subject to change without notice; at last report, the SLA was processing license applications from wineries in California, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Washington, a group that does not correspond to the reciprocal shipment state list because “substantial equivalence” is apparently different from reciprocity. A Washington application by a multi-facility winery reportedly resulted in separate licenses for different locations, leading to some confusion on the part of state tax authorities regarding separate versus consolidated tax reporting.) Licensees must file annual and semi-annual reports, retain records for three years, submit to state jurisdiction and taxpayer registration with permission for audits, use special case markings, verify purchaser age, and deliver only upon adult signature with photo ID. Reporting documents include Wine Manufacturer’s Report (filed semi-annually with the New York State Liquor Authority), Sales and Use Tax Return (sent quarterly to the attention of the New York State Sales Tax Processing Division), and Excise Tax Payment Form (sent monthly to the attention of the New York State Alcoholic Beverages Tax Processing Unit). Carriers must maintain state licenses and undertake substantial responsibility for averting delivery to underage recipients. Administrators in some remaining reciprocal states reportedly refused shipper licenses to New York wineries on the logically reversed grounds the New York law is not truly reciprocal. (To comply with *Granholm*’s message on reciprocal shipment, they should drop their own reciprocity requirements and not worry about New York’s.) They may have been influenced by the

color-coded Wine Institute map at <http://wi.shipcompliant.com/Home.aspx?SaleTypeID=1>, which does not identify New York as reciprocal.

Advertising: With respect to advertising in New York by out-of-state direct shipment licensees, the new law does not expressly repeal the ad ban under § 109(1), but the *Swedenburg* trial court found it invalid under the First Amendment and was not reversed on that point, so the ban appears to be effectively dead, whether or not enforcement is prohibited under a current injunction.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has approved “drop shipment” from wineries to retail accounts pursuant to special Internet orders from retailers without taking the goods into the selling wholesaler’s warehouse. The approved system reportedly requires automated routing of the order to an authorized wholesaler under the standard system, which includes invoicing from winery to wholesaler and from wholesaler to retailer, price posting, and label approval.

Litigation: On September 9, 2007, a federal district court upheld discrimination between in-state and out-of-state retailers in *Arnold’s Wines v. Boyle*, dismissing a complaint based on *Granholm*. The court relied on a 1990 Supreme Court case, quoted in *Granholm*, to the effect that states have a right to require three-tier systems, but seems to have missed *Granholm*’s message that upholding location discrimination requires evidence that it serves a legitimate state objective not achievable by non-discriminatory means. The case was appealed to the Second Circuit in October 2007 as *Buy Rite, Inc. v. Boyle* and heard on 20 January 2009. As of 10 June 2009, a contested motion by appellants for voluntary dismissal of the appeal was pending.

North Carolina

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding the no-fee shipper permit may ship wine its has formally listed with the state to consumers via a common carrier approved by the ABC Commission, up to two cases per month to any one customer, after notification to any wholesalers that purchase the same brand. Wineries shipping over 1,000 cases to all North Carolina consumers in a calendar year (not counting cases shipped home for winery visitors) must contract for wholesale distribution with at least one North Carolina wholesaler if any of them initiates a proposal.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in North Carolina, not to exceed 50 liters (4 liters if fortified) per importation without a permit. Theoretically, a consumer with a Purchase Transportation Permit could receive a shipment of up to 100 liters (40 liters if fortified).

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

North Dakota

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery or retailer that holds a \$50 direct shipping permit, pays excise taxes, and files reports may ship directly to a consumer who receives no more than 27 liters of wine and spirits per month from all out-of-state sources

combined, limited to personal use. Although the statute, which became effective in August 2007, is not clear on the point, it appears North Dakota may apply an annual 25,000-gallon limit on all direct sales and shipment by in-state wineries, rather than the 3-cases-per-month customer limit applicable to out-of-state wineries, raising a *Granholm* issue.

Ohio

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries that produce no more than 250,000 gallons annually and qualify for the federal small domestic producer tax credit may hold a \$25 type S permit to ship wine of its own production to resident consumers, who have a household limit of 24 cases annually from all wineries, subject to tax, annual reporting to the Division of Liquor Control, and a label approval requirement costing \$50 for each label. Wineries not previously qualified to ship to wholesalers must complete an S-5 registration, fee \$100.

Direct Distribution: Wineries that produce no more than 250,000 gallons annually and qualify for the federal small domestic producer tax credit may hold a \$25 type B-2a permit to ship wine of its own production to Ohio retailers.

Litigation: In a 2006 case arising from enforcement of a statutory ban on private importation of alcoholic beverages purchased from an out-of-state retailer, a state judge ruled that *Granholm* prevents prosecution of individuals for bringing beer purchased from an out-of-state retailer into Ohio, because of the discrimination relative to Ohio retail licensees.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Oklahoma

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Oklahoma for personal use of “the possessor, his family and guests,” after payment of excise tax (except for sacramental wine), limited by administrative interpretation of “personal use” to 1 liter per importation. The state has no formal method of collecting tax except through wholesale distribution, but carriers accept on-site purchases. According to a July 2005 state attorney general’s opinion, now reinforced by a federal court judgment (see “Litigation,” below), an on-site purchaser may ship wine from in-state wineries to the purchaser’s residence, but in-state wineries may not ship to any unlicensed person anywhere.

Direct Distribution: In November 2008 voters approved State Question 743, allowing in-state and out-of-state producers of up to 10,000 gallons of wine a year to sell wine directly to retail stores and restaurants, so long as they do not sell to Oklahoma wholesalers and make the wines available equally to all state retailers.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Litigation: On November 15, 2006, the federal district court granted summary judgment in *Action Wholesale Liquors v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Comm'n* for the wholesaler plaintiffs, who sued to level down the discrimination favoring in-state wineries. State wineries had argued for sustaining the law, which appears to require leveling up or down to comply with *Granholm*. The court indicated its preference for leveling down, but stayed its ruling until June 15, 2007, to afford an opportunity for legislative repair of the law, which originated in a referendum. Because the legislature failed to act, upon expiration of the stay the court entered an injunction eliminating the in-state direct shipment privilege. The ruling invalidated Legislative Referendum 317, adopted by voters in 2000, amending the state constitution to allow direct distribution by in-state wineries only.

Oregon

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries holding a \$50 “direct shipper permit” may ship up to two cases per month per individual purchaser. A \$1000 bond is required to secure payment of privilege taxes.

Direct Distribution: A “wine self-distribution” permit allows out-of-state wineries to sell directly to the Commission and to licensees with license endorsements that permit receipt of directly distributed wine. See www.oregon.gov/OLCC/wine_shipping_2008.shtml.

Litigation: Oregon may have side-stepped the first court test of the *Costco* principle for wholesalers. The appeal in *Morchella Wine Cellars, LLC* from the OLCC’s refusal to issue a wholesaling license to a Washington winery appears mooted, as the direct distribution option that became effective at the beginning of 2008 ostensibly provides privileges substantially identical to the wholesaling licenses available to Oregon wineries.

Pennsylvania

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Although the major carriers ship only intrastate since December 12, 2006, state law appears to have offered out-of-state wineries two methods for delivering wine to consumers, one by direct shipment and one via a state liquor store. Carriers’ refusal of direct shipments to Pennsylvania consumers from out-of-state wineries would presumably not apply to shipments to a government agency, but uncertainties about proper handling of wines have deterred use of the second alternative. Moreover, municipalities may prohibit shipments to liquor stores within their jurisdictions by local option referendum. Direct shipment to consumers remains a theoretical possibility, based on a “limited winery license” created for Pennsylvania wineries using “fruits generally grown in Pennsylvania,” www.lcb.state.pa.us/plcb/cwp/view.asp?a=1327&q=548215&plcbNav=32370. In a non-binding informal opinion, counsel for the Liquor Control Board described the license as available to out-of-state wineries as a response to an injunction against prohibiting direct shipment (see the *Cutner* case in “Litigation,” below), pending expected legislative change. The Board has published no regulations or procedures for direct shipment, leaving it unclear whether the special permission form would be required to use fruit grown in the shipping winery’s home state, which a Pennsylvania winery importing the fruit would have to file. An old procedure for wineries with direct shipment licenses to ship to state liquor stores,

www.lcb.state.pa.us/plcb/cwp/view.asp?a=1328&q=554550&plcbNav=32369, requires pickup by the purchaser, limited to wine not on sale in state stores and 9 liters per month maximum for a single consumer, subject to a \$4.50 handling fee, 18% excise tax, 6% sales tax (7% for Philadelphia and Allegheny counties), and an annual report requirement.

Direct Distribution: The court decision allowing direct shipment to consumers also permits shipment to hotel and restaurant accounts.

Litigation: In Advisory Notice No. 21 (09/30/05), the Liquor Control Board ordered in-state wineries, which had enjoyed direct shipment privileges within the state, to follow the roundabout state store delivery procedure described above, beginning November 1, 2005. On November 3, 2005, local wineries responded by filing *Pennsylvania Wine Association v. Commonwealth* in state court, and on November 7, 2005 obtained a temporary restraining order against enforcement of Notice No. 21. On November 9, 2005, the federal district court in *Cutner v. Newman*, a *Granholm*-based suit challenging the discrimination that Notice No. 21 attempted to end by leveling down, granted plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings, enjoining the state from “prohibit[ing] out-of-state wineries from selling and shipping wine directly to consumers, hotels and restaurants” (but not necessarily from requiring licenses, collecting taxes, *etc.*), as long as in-state wineries “are not subject to equivalent restrictions.” On November 10, 2005 the state court in *Pennsylvania Wine Association v. Commonwealth* entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of Notice No. 21, effectively declaring local wineries free of restrictions equivalent to those on out-of-state wineries. Thus, the state court system brought state law back into conflict with *Granholm* and effectively prevented the state from leveling down administratively.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Legislation: Senate Bill 787 was referred to the Law & Justice Committee on 23 April 2009; the measure would license producers, wholesalers and retailers to ship two cases per month directly to consumers, subject to tax. House Bill 960, referred to the Liquor Control Committee on 17 March 2009, would allow direct shipment for wineries with a maximum production of 200,000 gallons. House Bill 186, which creates a direct shipping permit for wineries, retailers, and wholesalers, is in the same committee. Senate Bill 454, which creates a direct shipping permit with specific tax requirements, remains in the Law and Justice Committee. Senate Bill 487, which allows for importation of up to 256 oz. of wine for personal consumption, was re-referred to the Appropriations Committee on 16 March 2009. The legislature is expected to adjourn the current session in 2010.

Rhode Island

On-site Sales: After payment of tax, a winery may ship directly to fill an order “for non-business purpose” personally placed by the purchaser at the producing winery’s place of business. The Division of Tax will fax authority to ship after payment of tax (\$0.60/gal. excise plus 7% sales) and submittal of the wine sales invoice, which can be faxed to the Division at 401-222-6314. The state continues to enforce an informal maximum of 5 shipments per year, not to exceed 3 gallons per shipment, to any one consumer, but will

sometimes allow a single first shipment of a greater quantity. Shipments to the Liquor Control Administration to fill special orders are still permitted.

Litigation: A suit challenging direct shipment prohibition was dismissed, but state law remains vulnerable to challenge under *Granholm* for discrimination in favor of Rhode Island wineries.

Legislation: Senate Bill 2125, which would have allowed in-state and out-of-state wineries and retailers holding a \$100 direct shipper permit to ship to Rhode Island residents in wet areas, limited to 24 cases to per individual per calendar year from each winery, died in the Senate Committee on Constitutional and Regulatory Issues when the regular legislative session ended on June 21, 2008.

South Carolina

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding an out-of-state shipper license (\$600 per two-year license term, application at www.sctax.org/nr/rdonlyres/28a1ee91-3802-4a8b-b261-8d958efb96db/0/ab1571.pdf) and has registered with the Department of Revenue (\$50 fee), www.sctax.org/nr/rdonlyres/57289904-9cf6-470b-b0e5-e6c3a71654dd/0/sctc11122206.pdf, may sell and ship to consumer via state-authorized common carrier, up to 24 bottles per month for a single legal resident of state for personal use. Annual returns are required for both excise and sales taxes. The statutes seem to require a separate retailing license, but reportedly the state is not requiring it. Direct shipment does not require a wine producer certificate.

On-site Sales: The direct shipment statute probably voids a 1944 Attorney General Opinion allowing state residents to carry up to one gallon into the state for personal use, which would have opened an alternative method for in-person purchases.

Two-tier Distribution: Out-of-state wineries may ship products that are not distributed in the state to a wholesaler for resale directly to ordering consumer, with payment of taxes.

Three-tier Distribution: Although the state has not enacted statutory restraints, it may qualify freedom of contract by administrative rulings.

South Dakota

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in South Dakota for personal use, not to exceed 1 gallon per importation.

Tennessee

Direct Shipment Basics: Effective 1 July 2009, a business currently licensed in any state as a wine manufacturer, producer, supplier, importer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer holding a Tennessee wine direct shipper license may ship up to 12 cases of wine annually to a resident of Tennessee who is at least 21 years old for the resident's personal use and not for resale. The Alcoholic Beverage Commission has been authorized since 4 June 2009 to adopt regulations, but it is not known when the licensing procedure will be in place. Licensure requires a \$300 initial registration, a \$150 annual renewal fee, and

submission to state jurisdiction. Out-of-state licensees will report shipments and file excise and sales tax returns annually. The new provisions appear to render irrelevant another 2009 enactment making out-of-state wineries eligible to hold Tennessee winery licenses.

On-site Sales: State law prohibits possession of non-sacramental wine on which excise tax has not been paid, but does not provide a means for payment of tax except through wholesale distribution. However, the state reportedly has not enforced existing statutes requiring all wine entering to the state to be consigned to a licensed wholesaler, allowing shipment home of on-site purchases not exceeding one gallon in reliance on another statute that forbids personal importation only in quantities exceeding that amount, a practice likely to be reexamined when the new direct shipment law is in force. At last report, carriers accepted shipments home of up to 1 gallon of wine purchased in person on-site by state residents from any winery, but that policy may be modified when off-site direct shipment becomes lawful under licensing.

Litigation: On October 24, 2008 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Jelovsek v. Bredesen* affirmed part of the federal district court's March 2007 judgment on the pleadings in favor of the state and wholesalers, leaving the on-site requirement in place, and remanded the case to the trial court for better development of the evidentiary record. The appellate court agreed with the trial judge that the statutes and regulations treated all wineries facially the same and did not constitute overt discrimination as was found in *Granholm* and that plaintiffs had failed to produce the evidence required to show the existence of a direct shipment market and exclusion of out-of-state wineries from it. The decision also applies to the 2006 *S.L. Thomas Family Winery* suit, which was consolidated with *Jelovsek*. After remand, the trial court stayed proceedings on 23 March 2009, pending action by the legislature. After passage of a direct shipment law without an on-site requirement (see "Direct Shipment Basics," above), the intervenor Tennessee winery trade association moved on 29 May 2009 for dismissal, which the plaintiff opposes. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has extended the time to file a petition for certiorari to 25 June 2009.

Legislation: With enactment and signature of HB1549/SB944 (see "Direct Shipment Basics," above), other direct shipping bills were taken off calendar and died with adjournment on 18 June 2009.

Texas

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding both a sales tax permit and an out-of-state winery direct shipper's permit may ship up to three gallons in a rolling 30-day period to an "ultimate consumer" with proof of age anywhere in the state, subject to state excise tax (with a quarterly return) and a 35,000 gallon annual limit (apparently on all sales to consumers, not only to those in Texas), via a carrier holding a Texas carrier permit. On 1 September 2009, the volume limits on shipments to a consumer will rise; see "Legislation," below. On 1 January 2009, the permit fee structure changed to a two-year period and added a \$160 annual "surcharge," resulting in a change from a one-year \$75 fee for the shipper permit to a two-year fee totaling \$470. Permit holders submit to personal jurisdiction in Texas state and federal courts and, for any proceedings by or against the Commission, to venue in Travis County. Shipper's permits are not issued to

applicants that have any financial or control interests in a Texas wholesaler or retailer prohibited by state tied house law. Information on winery and retailer direct shipment issues as of June 14, 2007 and links to download application forms are at www.tabc.state.tx.us/leginfo/Wine/Default.htm, which at last visit had not been revised to reflect the decision in the retailer suit. (See “Litigation,” below.)

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Texas, not to exceed 3 gallons per 30-day period (1 gallon if nonresident), subject to payment of tax.

Litigation: In an important decision on January 14, 2008, the federal district court resolved eight pending motions, including motions for summary judgment by both sides, in *Siesta Village Market, LLC v. Perry and Wine Country Gift Baskets.Com v. Steen*, which it had consolidated with *Siesta Village* in June 2006, leaving no doubt that *Granholtm* applies to non-producing retailers in the same manners as to wineries, but ample doubt about the logistics of direct shipments by retailers. A statutory amendment, Senate Bill 1229, had become effective September 1, 2007, reducing the delivery area of Texas package store licensees with local cartage permits to “the county.” The apparent purpose was to foil the out-of-state retailer plaintiffs’ *Granholtm* argument by restricting local retailer delivery, but the in-county dispensation prevented its having that effect. At this point, it appears that *Siesta Village* renders the statutes that would require importation by a wholesaler invalid as applied to retailers shipping directly to consumers, and that it would be possible to use a “drop shipment” transaction to comply with the three-tier requirement, in which, for example, a California winery or importer invoices a Texas guerilla wholesaler, who invoices the California retailer, with the wine going directly from the retailer to the consumer. Alternatively, invalidity of the statutes that would prevent the nonresident winery or importer from holding a Texas wholesaling license at its California location could render existing arrangements compliant with the valid portions of Texas law –assuming the regulatory agency would issue the licenses without a specific court order. All parties appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where the case was argued 31 March 2009. As of 20 May 2009, the parties were skirmishing over citation of additional authorities.

Legislation: On 19 June 2009, the governor signed HB 1084, which takes effect 1 September 2009. It raises permissible volume of direct shipment by setting maximum delivery to a single consumer at 9 gallons (45 bottles plus a split) in any calendar month and 36 gallons (15 cases) in any 12-month period. Bills that would have increased the production cap for direct shippers from 35,000 gallons to 55,000 gallons died with *sine die* adjournment on 31 May 2009.

Utah

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: There are no provisions for shipment (whether sold on-site or off-site) to an individual, and email solicitations in the state present risks. Senders of email that offers wine or contains a link to a site offering wine must comply with Title 13, Chapter 9, of the Utah Code, which provides penalties for email sent to an underage recipient whose address is on a state registry. Consumers can request the

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to special-order wines that are not available in the state stores from registered vendors, to be picked up by the consumer at a state store; there is no charge to the winery for registering or to the consumer for ordering, but the process takes approximately two months.

Vermont

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A U.S. winery holding a direct shippers license may ship up to 12 cases to a consumer, totaling not more than 29 gallons (about 150 *ml* more than 12 cases) to any one Vermont resident in a calendar year.

Direct Distribution: The shipment statute also allows shipper license holders to sell up to 2,000 gallons of wine a year directly to first- or second-class licensees (restaurants and grocery stores).

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Vermont, up to 6 gallons of table wine and 8 quarts of fortified wine or brandy per importation, not subject to excise tax.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Virginia

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A licensed wine shipper (\$65 annual license, plus one-time \$65 application fee, not restricted to producers and also applicable to beer) may ship up to two cases per month to a Virginia consumer via an approved carrier. Authorization by the owner of the brand is required if the brand is not registered to the shipping licenseholder. A useful checklist for preparing an application and links to resources are at <http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2007/09/06/virginia-out-of-state-winery-shipper%E2%80%99s-application-checklist> . Official state license information is at www.abc.state.va.us/enforce/shipperslicense.html. Additionally, any person who owns “an establishment with adequate inventory, shelving, and storage facilities” *other than* a retail store open to the public may hold a \$150 Virginia “Internet wine retailer license,” to take orders by Internet or telephone and ship the wine directly to Virginia consumers.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Virginia, not to exceed four liters per importation.

Direct Distribution: To avert direct distribution by out-of-state wineries, wholesaler-supported legislation took away direct distribution by Virginia wineries. Since July 1, 2006, local wineries have been forbidden to sell to restaurants, wine shops and grocery stores, although the September 11, 2006 ruling of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals restores their direct distribution to state-run retail stores. Since July 1, 2007, any winery is eligible under the \$185 “restricted wholesale license” to become the “client” of a Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services-managed nonprofit wholesaler, which

could then sell up to 3,000 cases of the client's products annually to private retailers in areas where the winery has not appointed a Virginia wholesaler. Reportedly, the roundabout device is intended to preserve the three-tier structure within the state while impeding out-of-state sales to Virginia retailers, by invoking the form, but not the substance, of a "state distribution monopoly." Procedures were to have been explained in a circular letter that seemingly never appeared; at last visits, the ABC Commission website still said, "More information will be provided as it becomes available," and the DA&CS website was silent on the point.

Litigation: On September 11, 2006, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Brooks v. Vassar*, upheld Virginia's 4-liter limit on personal importation and its statute permitting only in-state "farm" wineries access to the state-run retail store system. The Supreme Court declined to review the decision, leaving numerous questions unanswered regarding the ability of states to impede interstate commerce. Under its original name, *Bolick v. Robertson*, the suit had challenged discrimination in direct shipment before *Granholm*. The trial court enjoined enforcement of a number of state statutes, leading to a legislative change while an appeal was pending. That case was remanded by the Court of Appeals to the district court as *Bolick v. Danielson*, for consideration of the constitutionality of the revised statute in light of *Beskind v. Easley*, a Fourth Circuit level-down opinion also rendered before the *Granholm* decision. On remand, the complaint was amended again, and the case proceeded under its current name, challenging persistent discrimination against out-of-state sellers. The district court leveled down on all discrimination issues, creating a crisis for Virginia wineries, and both sides appealed. While that appeal was pending, the state again amended its statutes, essentially adopting the district court view. In its September 2006 ruling, the Court of Appeals dismissed the direct shipment part of the case as having been mooted by the remedial legislation, leaving the current license system in place.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted substantial statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Washington

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: The operator of a U.S. winery that has registered with the Washington Department of Revenue, collects and returns applicable sales taxes, pays excise taxes on monthly returns in substantially the same manner as state wholesalers, and *either* holds a state wine shipper's permit *or* holds a certificate of approval and has notified the Board of its intent to ship to consumers may ship directly to a Washington resident. Forms can be found at <http://liq.wa.gov/publications/WineryToConsumer.asp>. Permit holders insure that carriers have verified recipients' age and sobriety and obtain recipient signatures. Shippers must "clearly and conspicuously" display license or permit numbers in their advertising. Wineries may also ship to the Liquor Control Board to fulfill consumer special orders, subject to tax and markup, in reasonable amounts as approved by the Board.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required)

in Washington, free of tax and markup, for personal or household use, up to 2 liters of spirits or wine or 288 fluid ounces of beer, in no more than one importation per month.

Direct Distribution: Out-of-state wineries holding certificates of approval can obtain endorsements to ship up to 100 cases per month directly to retailers under a law passed in response to the commerce clause ruling in the *Costco* case, which is not involved in the current appeal. The Board released an “interpretive statement” of some of the law’s ambiguous provisions before passage; a copy is available on request to the email address shown on the header to these notes. The direct distribution statute, as interpreted in the statement, modifies the 16 November 2004 Bulletin No. 05-04, which at last report was still posted at www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Bulletin%2005-04.pdf. Ambiguity about who can contract with a common carrier for delivery was clarified by enactment of SB 5898 in 2007, but questions remain as to the ability of retailers to arrange carrier shipment of wines from out-of-state consignors in quantities greater than 100 cases per month and in mixed shipments of wines produced by different wineries.

Litigation: On January 29, 2008 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Costco* affirmed the district court injunction against enforcement of laws requiring suppliers of wholesale and retail licensees to post prices and hold them unchanged for thirty days, but upheld other restrictions challenged in the case. On April 1, 2008 the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing filed by Costco, and the time for appeal to the Supreme Court has expired. Posting does not apply to retail sales, so the injunction is relevant to direct distribution, but not to DTC shipment.

Legislation: At last report, the Liquor Control Board intended to publish by 15 July 2009 interim policies and procedures for applying 2009 legislation that becomes effective 26 July 2009, with formal rule-making to follow. The new laws, dealing with numerous matters, eliminated price posting, but not uniform pricing, which implies holding for some period. The Board has already announced it is devising an audit system to enforce the uniform pricing rule and related restraints upheld by the Court of Appeals. House Bill 2099, which would have allowed retailer direct shipment, died with *sine die* adjournment on 26 April 2009.

West Virginia

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Wineries may hold a \$150 or \$250 permit for shipping up to 18 liters per month per resident purchaser by “licensed and bonded” carrier, subject to excise and to state and local sales taxes, a monthly shipment reporting requirement, and submittal of a brand list with the license application. (The lower license fee is for shippers who ship only dry unfortified wine. Apparently, the higher fee applies for licensees who may also ship “dessert wines,” whether or not fortified, and to shippers of Port, Sherry or Madeira.) Limited liability companies are subject to additional filing fees and registration requirements. Many details of the law, which became effective June 8, 2007, are ambiguous or contradictory. Direct shipment does not seem to require brand registration (\$100 per brand for three years), which applies only to a winery or other wine supplier “who sells or offers to sell or solicits or negotiates the sale of wine to any licensed West Virginia distributor.” The license appears to be available only to shippers who do not have West Virginia distributors, as holders of direct shipper licenses may not sell to state distributors or retailers, although it might be possible to read in an implied

qualification, “under the shipper license,” thereby allowing a winery to hold also a supplier license for sales to wholesalers. With that proviso, any winery, wholesaler or retailer licensed in its home state appears eligible for the license. Direct shippers of non-U.S. wine must acquire it from a domestic licensed supplier. Carrier licensing and bonding, prohibition of shipment to dry counties or municipalities, age verification requirements for delivery personnel, and penalties for improper delivery (including felony charges and civil liability for knowingly transporting an unauthorized shipment) may deter carrier acceptance of shipments. Useful information about procedures and links to resources are at <http://shipcompliantblog.com/blog/2007/07/16/more-information-about-the-west-virginia-direct-shipping-application-process>. Wineries may also ship to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission to fulfill consumer special orders, subject to markup.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in West Virginia, not to exceed 10 gallons per importation.

Three-tier Distribution: State statutes are ambiguous regarding certain restraints on freedom of contract.

Wisconsin

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: Licensed wineries located anywhere in the U.S. and holding a Wisconsin permit (\$200 for two years) may ship wine directly to an of-age and non-intoxicated individual in Wisconsin. The individual may receive no more than 108 liters of wine annually from any combination of out-of-state shippers and is responsible for compliance with the annual limit. Sales tax, excise tax and reporting are required quarterly.

Direct Distribution: Licensing statutes appear to authorize issuance of wholesale licenses to out-of-state businesses in some circumstances. However, the current direct shipment law, which became effective 1 October 2008, severely restricts direct distribution by Wisconsin wineries, presumably to permit the state to prohibit it to out-of-state wineries. Direct distribution is limited to wineries that produce less than 25,000 gallons of wine in a year. Eligible wineries have until the end of the year to form a “co-op” wholesale establishment, which can distribute to Wisconsin retailers as a regularly licensed wholesaler. The co-op must have a single physical location within the state of Wisconsin, the same feature that resulted in invalidity of the New York law in *Granholm* with respect to winery locations, but which was upheld in a post-*Granholm* New York case for other tiers. The maximum number of cooperatives is limited to six (presumably the first six to qualify), and in any event to whatever number have been formed by December 31, 2008.

Three-tier Distribution: The state has enacted statutory restraints on freedom of contract.

Wyoming

Winery Direct Shipment Basics: A winery holding a \$50 out-of-state shipper license may ship to consumers, not to exceed 2 cases to the same household in any 12-month period, subject to tax and substantial record-keeping and reporting requirements.

On-site Sales: Under the federal direct shipment statute, a winery may ship wine purchased while the purchaser was physically present at the selling winery from anywhere in the state where the winery is located to a consumer (adult signature required) in Wyoming, not to exceed 3 liters per importation, tax-free.

Direct Distribution: The license also allows shipment of items not listed by the state to Wyoming retailers.

Three-tier Distribution: In-state distribution is a state monopoly.

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